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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether a 50-year commercial ground lease- having
a present value the trial court found to be at least $500,000
may be forfeited based solely upon the following three alleged
defaults:
(a) An alleged "encumbrance" of the fee interest
which the Court of Appeals ruled had no legal effect ar.d which
was created by a December, 1987 pledge of the leasehold
interest soiely for financing.
(b) An alleged "ass ignment" of the lease, made
solely as security for trie sam.e financing transaction, which
the Court of Appeals ruled also had no legal effect, and which
the lessors conceded did not violate a general lease
prohibition against assig nm.e nts .
(c) Weeds remaining on the subject property
despite the lessees' reasonable efforts at weed contn !.
2. Whether the lessees were entitled to a row trial
because the trial court based its forfeiture decision upon
eignt additional alleged deraults which the Court of Appeals
implicitly ruled shou Id not have been cons idered, bee,, use they
were not included in the not ices of default and forfeiture sent
by the lessors .
3. Whether the lessors violated the imp 1ioo
contractual covenant of good faith ,:.nd fair dealing :i
wi thholding consent to trie above "a; s ignment" , becaust tlie
- 1-
lessors intended to reguire renegotiation of the rental amount
as a condif ion to such consent.
REPORT OF OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT_OE APPEALS
The reported Court, of Appeals Opinion is found at
184 Utah Adv. Rpt . 55 . West Publ 1shi ng a iso Lndi cates that, the
Op ini on will be reported at 82 9 P.2d 160. A copy of the
Opinion is attached hereto as Appendix "A", and a copy of the
Order denying rehear ing is attached hereto as Appendix "C".
SUPREME COURT JUR1SDI CTJDON
The Court of AppeaIs' decision was entered on April 3,
1992 (App. "A"). The Court of Appeals extended the time for
filing the petition for rehearing until April 24, 1912
(App. "B"). The petition for rehearing was filed on April 23,
1992, and the Order denying that pet it ion was entered on
May 14, 1992 (App. "C"). This Court has jurisdiction to review
the Court of Appeals decision by writ, of certiorari pursuant to
Utah. Cod_e_juirK $ 78-2-2(3) (a) and (5) (1953 as amended).
CONTROLLING P^OVJSIONK OF' CONSTITUTIONS,
STATUTES ,"ORD INANCES AND REGIjLLATTjDNS
There are no such provisions that appellants deem to
be conf rolling.
STATEMENT _OF THE CASE
PI a int. if£s-Appel lees (hereina ftor somet imes referred
to cumulatively as the "Howes") are successors-in-interest to
the lessors under a fifty-year ground lease dated October 14,
19 60. (Trial Ex . 1, App . "H" .) Def endant.s (somet i:nes refer red
io cumu1 at ive1y as "Manivest ") are suocesso rs-i n •in fe res t to
the lessees. With the lessors" consent, Manivest and .to
predecessor built trie Southlake Shopping Center on the leased
property, which is located on the southwest corner of Ninth
East and 5600 South in Murray, Utah . With the Howes' ronsent,
Manivest became the lessee as the general partner of a limited
partnership (National Realty Ltd.), in November 1971. (Trial
Ex. 6.)
The Howes filed this action for forfeiture ei the
Lease in November, 1983. The Veritied Complaint (R. 2,
App . "G") a1leged only the fol lowing defaults:
1. That Man ivest vio 1ated paragraphs 4 ar.c • of the
Lease (prohibiting certain assignments and encumbrance'-. ,
respectively) by using the Lease as security for f ir.a:::: lng
obtained from Valley Bank in May, r-78, June, 1982 arc:
Decem.be r , 19 87 - January, 19 88 , wi thout the Howes ' consent.
(App. "G", 1HI23-28.)
2. That Manivest violated paragraph 5 of the Lease
by failinq to control weeds and properly maintain the
proper ty. (App. "G" , 11*112 , 21 , 22 .)
Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Veritied Complaint alleged
in effect that the Lease1 allowed the Howes to withhold consent
to any lease assignments requited by lenders providir..;
financing to Manivest, as leverage to force renegoti a• ion ot
the $24,000 per year rental.
The Howes did not allege fnat they had sufft :ed any
da r.a oo as the result of the de: an 11 :; . Tin.' pr aye t ::•. r roll e:
- j -
sought no damages , other" than any rent, a Is due pi ior to
termination (none having been alleged in the Complaint) and
reasonable rental va lue after not 1ce of termi nat ion was given
by the Howes.
Manivest countere 1aimed (R. 70, Add. "I") , contend 1ng
that the Howes had a duty to consent to the Valley Bank lease
assignments, because there was no valid business reason for
withholding consent, and a 1leged the Howes acted in bad faith
in refusing to consent.
The case was tried to the court on March 6 and 7,
1990. During the course or the trial, Manivest. objected to the
Howes' offer of evidence or alleged lease defaults other than
those alleged in the Verified Complaint, on grounds of
surprise. (Tr. 44-52, 96.) Alternatively, Manivest moved for
a trial continuance in order to prepare a defense to these new
a1legat ions. (Id.) However, most of the evidence was admi tted
and no trial continuance was granted. On March 9, 1990, the
Howes f i1ed a Motion to Amend Pleadings to Confo rm to the
Evidence. (R. 434.)
The court delivered its decision from the bench on
March 12, 1990 (R. t"> 1 (, , Ex. "D", App. "E" ) , tilling Mie Lease
was torteited, effective May si, 1988; dismissing Manivest 's
counterc 1aim; award ing the Howes rent a Is accruing aite: May 3 !,
1988 as liquidated damages; and awarding the Howes their
reasonab1e attorneys' lees (pursuant to pa rag raph 20 of the
lease). The court entered its Findings mid Conclusions
(R. 1008, App. "E") and Judgment of Eorfeitu:e and Order of
Possession (R. 1027, App. "D") on May 18, 1990.
Manivest then filed a timely Motion to Alter •r Amend
Judgment or for New Trial . (R . 1044 ). The motion a 1s .• sought
to reopen the evidence and made a proffer of Manivest';. defense
to some of the newly alleged defaults. (R. 1044, pp. .0-11.
See also, R. 676, Ex. "A" - "C.") That motion was den.ed.
(R. 1264.) Manivest then filed a timely Notice of Apr e. a 1
(R. 12 87) . On September 14, 1990, the Howes f iled a N tice of
Cross-Appeal (R. 1300) from the grant of a Manivest M. '.ion in
Limine.
The appea 1 was transferred to the Court of A; peals,
and on April 3, 1992 the Court of Appeals entered its decision
affirming the trial court. (App . "A" .) On May -4 , 1- '2
Manivest's petition for rehearing was denied (App . " 7" .)
Judge Orme dissented from both decisions.
STATEMENT _OE EACTS
1. The Lease and Option Agreement at :ssue oas
executed on October 14, I960. The .essors were members of trie
Howe family, succeeded in interest by the plaintiff 10 isf. The
lessee was Valley Shopping tenter, <\ general partner si.rp.
[App . "H" ; Court of Appea Is ' Op lmen ("Op in ion" ) , App . "A" ,
p. 2. !
2. Paragraph 4 or the Lease? authorized Va ; ay
Shopping Center to assign the Lease to a corporation. Valley
Shoppi ng Center exe :c ised th rs riglm by assign! n:i trie Le-.ise ' ;•
_ t _
South lake Shoppi ng Center, Inc. (Tr. 20, Trial Ex. 2, Opinion,
p. 2.) In 1971, the? Lease was assigned to National Realty,
Ltd., a limited partnership, with the Howes' consent.. (Trial
Ex. 5.) Professional Manivest was the general partner of
National. Although the lease contained an option to purchase,
the option was never exercised, and it expired. (App "H";
Opinion, p. 2.)
3. In September 198 3 , Mr . Ger ri t Steenbli k advi sed
Mani vest's Mr. Larry Leeper by letter that weeds we re qrowing
through the pavement on the southwest portion of the pr operty.
(Trial Ex. 23.) Manivest's management supervisor, Mr. S. L.
Dobson, responded by letter ot October 19, 1983, advising
Mr. Steenblik that the weeds had been sprayed. (Trial Ex. 24.)
4. 1n the period from Deacerr.be r , 1987 to January,
1988 Manivest. sought a $4,000,000 line of credit from Valley
Bank and Trust Company. Th is obligation was secured by a trust
deed, and an assignment of the Manivest ground lease and
subtenant leases. The assignment and trust deed we rea made for
security purposes only. (Opinion, p. 2.) Although the trust
deed did not. expressly limit its re.-ach to the Manivest
leasehold, the trust dee^d was never intended to encumber the
Howes' fee interest. (Tr. 114, 115.)
5. Manivest and Valley Hank sought the Howes'
consent to the assignment of the Howe lease as part of the
19 87-1988 transaction. The Howes' refused. (T: ial Ex. 19, 30 ,
Tr . 72, Opinion, p. 2. ) Thereafter , the Howes sent not ioes or
- u-
dot au It and termi nat ion based only on the ass igrimer.t , 'he f rust
deed, and weed growth on the property. (Opinion, pom t-3.)
Al though other default a1legations surfaced at trial, ui 1y the
three alleged defaults discussed herein formed the ba: ,s for
the Court of Appea1s' decisi on. (Opinion, pp. 2-3, n. 2. )
6 . In October 1988 , prior !o the f i11 ng of this
action, Valley Bank released the ass- ignment and reconvoyed the
trust deed. (Ti. bl, 255, Trial Ex. 16., Opinion, p. 3.)
7 . On July 10, 1989 , while this action 'was pend ing
in the trial court, Murray City issued a violation n., * ice
concerning weeds en a vacant tie Id which is part of t\o leased
pr em: ses . (Opinion , p . 3 .) To. is not ice was one of s- veral
himdied issued to various property owners. (Tr. 3"2. •
Mr . Dobs on had the weeds removed , and Mur ray Ci fy too --. no
further action. (Tr. 343.) Mr. Jerry Adamscn, Manivest's
property manager since June lq88, testified that Manivest
retained several firms to cut and spray weeds which o:ow and
accumulate on the shopping center property and the unieve loped
ground adjacent to it. (Tr. 382, 3 83.)
8. The trial court found that at the time f
ffifoitare of the lease, the present, value to Manive/e or the
cash flow f rom the subleases during the remaining fe: t or the
lease was between $5 00,00 0 and $600,000 (App . "E" , 1riding
N( . 7 6 .)
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Eorfeiture is an equitable rernedy that cannot be based
on teichnical, non-material defaults that caused no harm to the
lessors. Because one could not imagine more technical or
harmless defaults than the three that the Court of Appea1s
found to be sufficient for forfeiture, this Court should grant
c e r t io r a r i .
The first two alleged defaults were really one
transaction (the December 1987 pledge of the leasehold to
Va1 ley Lank as security for financing), which the Court of
Appeals found breached two lease provisions, a covenant against
"encumbrances" and a prohibition of "assignments." At page 5
of its Opinion, however, the Court of Appeals apparently
acknowledged that the a 1leged encumbiance created by the trust
deed was not "legally enforceable" and had no "legal effect."
Similarly, at cage (> the Court of AppeoaIs found the a 1leged
assignment to be a default justifying forfeiture? "regardless of
the legal effect of an actual or purported transler."
The final a 1leged det auIt was the failure to keep the
property freer from weeds. The.; Court of Appeals found
lorfoiture to be justi t ied even it Manivest's efforts at weed
control were reasonable. (Opinion, pp. 6-7.)
Eorfeiture on these facts is nothing more than a
contractual penalty, which is not permitted by law. At the
time of purported termination, the parties were only about h.-i'.f
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way through a 50-year ground lease. Thus, premature
termination resulted in a cash flow ,jss to M.-iruvest ( -.rid
windfa 11 to the Howes) that the trial court found to o- between
$500,000 and $600,000 when discounted to present value. On the
other hand, nowhere does the Court or Appeals suggest 'hat any
ha rm, to the Howes resulted from the three purported de: au 1ts .
While the Court cf Appeals considered oniy tr.- three
ci 1 leged defaults discus sec above, the trial court bast : its
forfeiture award upon the cumulative effect of a myr ia i of
other alleged defaults as well. However, the Court of Appeals
implicitly ruled that, these latter alleged defaults c~.ld not
be considered because they were not the subject or any not ice
tc Manivest. Opinion, pp. 2-3, n.2 and p. 7. At mir.i'um,
Manivest is entitled to a new trial to determine whetre-r a
finder of fact would award forfeiture, without the taint of the
a1leged defaults that we re not. the sub]ect of any not i -e.
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged tr- Howes'
implied contractua1 covenant of good faith and fair d<•.1r ng, it
attempted to avoid the imp 1red covenant by rul ing fha* Mam vest
waited too long to request, the Howes' consent to the Y.-iley
ban/:, transaction. However , the Com t of Appeals over . jked
fhat , even assuming consent was regi. .r red, an earI:er r•-ques-
wouId have been futile, civen the bad faith posrtion :• the
Howes that they were enti tled to renegotiate the rents ! amount
as a condition of giving consent.
I.
THE COURT OE APPEALS DEPARTED FROM PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS
COURT, AND FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, BY AFFIRMING LEASE FORFEITURE BASED UPON
THREE ALLEGED DEFAULTS THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND
TO BE TECHNICAL AND HARMLESS
Man ivest's briers cited cases from Utah and other
jurisdictions, uniformly ho 1d ing that forfeiture of a contract
is not permi tted absent a materi31 breach of that contract.
(Manivest open 1ng Brief, pp . 39-44 , App. "J". ) These
authorities also show the analysis to be roll owed in
distinguishing materi a 1 breaches from technical breaches,
wh ich cannot support a forfeiture because they cause no real
harm to the party seeking this most drastic remedy. (Id.)
The Court of Appea 1s ' doc is ion abandons t. hese
uniformly followed principles of law governing forfeiture, and
fails to provide any meaningful analysis showing why the three
alleged defaults considered by the Court justify forfeiture.
Instead, the Court's Opinion highlights the reasons why these
three alleged defaults could not be a basis for forfeiture.
A. Ihe Alleged "Encumbr ance" and "Ass :gnm,ent."
pefaults_ Resu 111 ng From the 1987 ~Va1 ley
Bank T ransact 1on We re Not a Propei_r__ Las 1s
L0 L.fJtOJjJ111 n3 Dor fe 1ture Because The Con rot
of Appea 1s Found They Had No Legal Ef_f_ect .
The Conrt of Appea1s apparently accepted Mani vest 's
argument that the trust deed had no legal effect on the Howes'
fee interest , because Man 1vest, could not mortgage any more than
it had, wh ich was only the leaseho Id . No net he less, the Cou rt
ruled that "legal impossibility is [not] a defense to breach o!
a lease covenant against encumbrances", that "whether the
-10-
Valley Bank trust deed is legally enfc rceab 1e is im.s at-•r1a_l to
whether Manivest breached the oovenant. against encumbi .onces" ,
and that "Manivest breached the lease covenant against
encumbrances, therefore, by recording the trust deed :t-ga rd 1ess
of its le?ga 1 effect". Opinion, pp. 4-5 (emphasis adder:).
Similarly, at page 6, the Court ruled that "Manivest t,: eached
the covenant against assigrmoent, therefore, reg a rd 1ess of tine
leg a 1 ef rect of an actual or pu rported transfe r. " (2:o nasis
added.)
In so ruling, the Court relied solely upon 15: ewe r v .
Peat ress, 595 P.2d 866 (Utah 1-79). That reliance is misplaced
1n Brewer, the grantor conveyed by wa rranty deed prop- :ty
:ncluded within a Special Improvement District that w,; created
prior to the conveyance. A It ho ugh the District comm.er. ted
construction of the improvements prior to the conveyance, the
property was not assessed, and the assessment lien die not
become ef fect ive, until after the conveyance.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' interprets* .on, the
issue in Brewer was not whether the Specia 1 Improvement
District encumbered the property, but when the encum.o: ance
occu rred , for purposes of dete i;nt n ing whether the g rji tor
oreached the war rant ies in the warranty deed at trie t :me of
conveyance. This Court mere ly ra led that since the
construction of the improvements beian before the core, eyance,
and the costs of construction ultimately would be nso usable to
the property, the property was encimoeied at "he fi:">_- •:" *h->
- 11-
conveyance, especially since? the grantor knew of these facts at
that t ime.
The Court of AppeaIs cor rect1y noted that Brewer
defines an encumbrance as "any rjght that a third person holds
in land which constitutes a burden or limitation upon the
rigrits of the fee title ho Ider ." Opinion, p. 5 (emphasi s
added); citing Brewer at 59:3 P.2d 868. However, contrary to
the Court of Appeals' analysis, that definition requires that
the third party have some legal "right" to burden or limit the
fee interest. In Brewer that legal right was created by the
const ruction of the improvements, which, by statute, would
ultimately a 1bow the Special Improvement District to "burden"
the fee interest by levying the assessment, and, if necessary,
by foreclosing on that interest to satisfy the assessment lien.
Accordingly, the Cour t of Appea1s erred in stating
that, "[w]hether the lien was 1ega 1ly enforceable was thus
unmater ia 1 to the Cour t 's an lays is of whet, her the 1ien
encumbered the proper ty in Brewer" . Opinion, p. j. Untier
Breweu , if the third party has no leg a 1 right to burden the fee
interest, there is no "encumbrance". If, in Br ewe_r , the?
Special Improvement Dint tried., had not constructed the
improvements, or had no statutory or other leogal right to
assess the property for imp ro vernent.s t.hat were constructed, but
wrongfully attemptexl to assess the property anyway, the grantee
might be "burdened" by having to dofeond against the1 illegal
-12-
assessment, but that illegal assessment would not breath the
grantor's war ranty against "encumbrances".
Similarly, here, the Valley Bank trust deed was not an
"encumbrance" of the "demised premises", or the Howes' fee
interest therein, because it gave Valley Bank no legal "right"
to "burden" anything other than Manivest's leasehold. Even if
Valley Bank had foreclosed on that, trust deed, there wild have
been no burden on the Howes' fee interest, because all that the
trustee can sell is what the trustor (Man 1vest) owns. Jtan
Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2) (1953 as amended). Thus, contrary to
the Court of AppeaIs' Opinion, an encumbrance or ass 1cnmenf
•without "legal effect" is not even a. technical breach )f a
covenant against assignments or encumbrances, much le: s a
breach sufficient to warrant forfeiture. See, Man ley v. Poo 1 ,
24 6 P. 386, 387 (Okla. lc<26); See also, 20 Am. Jur. 2o,
Covenants, Condi tions, and Rest r_ict :ons , § 83 , p . 647, n .9 ; See
also, 5 A.L.R. 1084, 1086-1087, Anriot. Unfounded outs' inrijjig
c 1aims to or aga inst rea 1 prope rty .is breach of coven :nf_s of
seed .
Also, the Court of Appeal:;' reference to the legal
eifeet of the "ass ignment" to Va 1lev Bank purports tt add ress
only Manivest's a rgument that any ass ignment falling within the
purview of the "unassignable" language of lease paraq•aph 4 was
a nullity, rather than a default. However, Manivest' if her
argument on this issue, -which was over looked by the C ur f , was
that a lease assignment given st'lely as security tor • Lan is
not. precluded by a general covenant against lease assignments.
(App . ".I" , p . 77 ; Manivest Reply Brief, App . "K" , pp . 10-13.)
Ultimately, even the Howes agreed with this position. (Howes'
Trial Brief, R. 4.35, App. "M" , pp. 18, 30.)
B. We?eds Remaining After Manivest 's_ Reasonable
Effor ts at Weed Cont ro I Ai so We r_e Not, A
Pr oper Basi s Joo r Af firmi ng Fo rtei ture
In response to Manivest 's a rguniont that it should be
held only to a standard of reasonab 1eness in cont ro 1ling weeds
on the property, the Court of Appea 3s stated that "[T]he lease,
however , was s i lent as to the st arid a rd of ma inten anee to be
applied", and that "[i If t.he parties intended t. hat maintenance?
would be governed by a reasonableness standard, the^y should
have included it in the contract". (Opinion, pp. 6-7 .)
These- statements overlook the settled rule of contract
irite rp ret af ior that where a contract, is s ileint as to the
standard of performance, a standard of reasonableness will be
presumed or inplied. The Rrower: Co. v. Oarrison, 468 P.2d 464,
473 (Wash. App. 1970); Cf ., Puget Inv. Co. v. Wenck, 221 P.2d
459, 464 (Wash. 1^50) (Lease providing that tenant maintain
premises in 'first class state? of repair ' reguirod only such
repairs as were "reasonably necessary" to conduct tenant's
business.) To apply an absolute? standard, as t.he Court, of
Appeals apparently did, leads to ludicrous rersulfs.
A single weeel left growing on the property could
result in forfeiture, regardless of t.he lengths to which the
lessee went in attempting to exterminate-1 weed growth. See,
Wei nor v . Wi 1s n ire; Oil Co . of Texas , 3 8'i P .7(1 8 08 , 8 0 8 (Kan.
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1964) (In interpreting a contract "[r 1esi. 1ts which ...: educe
the terms of the contract to a:i absurdity should be av ided".)
A party should not be required to include a provision .n a
contract, stating, "This contract will be interpreted
reasonably", and instead has a right to expect that a court
will interpret it reasonably, 1:1 .
At page 7 of the Opinion, the Court of Apnea .. a1so
stated that "Manivest was cited by Mo rray City for or" •tng
weeds on the property". However, the Court also over! oketl
that, one of these citations was issued on July 10 , 198-
(Ex. 34) , over a year after the pu rpoi ted rorfeitu:e, aid whi1e
this litigation was pendi ng . The otner citation was ...sued on
Apr 11 2 1, 1983 (Ex. 23) , almost five years before f.ie - irsf
Not ice of Defau11. Accordingly, neither of these citations
could have been a basis for torreiture.
C. The Cou rt of Appea 1s' Rat iona le For
Fo rfeitu re Pe nrit s That Remedy To Be Use 1
As An _I_m.o_e rm iss lo I_e _Co nt r_ac tua1 Pen a 1*y
Even assuming that the "encumbrance", "assignment" or
weeds constitute?:] breaches of the lease, the Court of Appeals'
own descriptions of these detaults, quoted above, snow lust how
technical and meaningless they really were. Nonethei; ;s, the
Court brushed aside all of Manivest's arguments ccnoe: :i:nc the
gross inequ it ie s of forfeiture here, except, o nn .
For some reason, the Court, focused only on f so va Iue
of the improvements. After noting at t.he? beginning o: the
Opinion that Man ives1: or its predecosso rs had an cpt i n t
purchase the property which they declined to exercise, the
Court stated at page 7 of the Op 1nion:
We have reviewed the remaining arguments
raised on appea 1 concerning t.he appropr iate-
ness of forfeiture. Because the option to
purchase had expired and the parties agreed
that the Howes wou1d succeed to the impr oye-
rr.ents upon termination, we deem them to be
wi thout mer it.
(Emphas is added.) Whiie Man ivest agrees that the Court is not
requi red to specifically address each and eveiy argument raised
by the parties, Manivest believes that the Court overlooked the
two most, important points:
1. The real loss to Manivest, and wiridf a 1 1 to
the Howes, was not the value? of the improvements, but the cash
f low from t.he shopp ing center subleases over the 20-25 years
remain ing on the lease at the time of forfeiture. The trial
court found the present va lue of this loss and wi ndf a 11 to be
$500,000 - $60 0,000. (App. "E", Finding No. 26.)
2. Nowhere in the Court's Opinion is there? even
a hint of any harm to the Howes that could justify an award to
them in excess of half a million dollars. Instead, this award
is nothing mo re than a pen a 1t_y imposed upon Man ivest for on
al legend encumbrance? and assignment that in the Court et
Appea 1s ' own words had no " leg a1 ef fect" , and for the presence?
of a few weeds despi te Manivest's reasonable efforts at weed
contro 1 .
On these facts, a $500,000 - $600,000 awnrd to trie
Howes by the tr ial court pursuant to a contractual 1 iquiclafed
- 1 6-
damages provision wou id have to be reversed as a pena 1t y.
Abbott v. Goodwin, 809 P.2d 716 (Ore. App. 1991); Such an award
is no less a penalty when it results from forfeiture.
Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 812 P.2d 253, 258 (Idaho 1991)
I I .
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS INDICATED THAT 0\"LY
THREE OF THE ALDEGED DEFAULTS COULD PROPERLY BE
CONSIDERED, PRIOR DECISIONS BY THIS COURT ESTABLISH
THAT MANIVEST IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL FREE OF
THE TAINT OF THE EIGHT ADDITIONAL DEFAULTS FOUND BY
THE TRIAL COURT.
Because the Court of Appea Is' Opinion considered only
the three allegations of default that were the subject of
written notice to Manivest from the Howes, Manlvest understands
the Opinion to mean that these were the only three that
properly could be considered. Opinion, pp. 2-3, n. 2 irid
p. 7. Utah law reguires written notice of default ano
opportunity to cure as a condition precedent to forfei-ure,
even if the lease does not. (App. "K", pp. 3-10.)
However, the trial court's award of forfeiture was
based upon ei ght additional a 1leged def au Its that were' not the
subject of written notice, and were raised for the first time
at trial. (App. "K", pp. 6-7.) In issuing its decisi n from
the bench, the trial court recited its findings on all of these
alleged detaults and then stated:
The cumulative effect and cause 1sic1 of the
cour se of conduct by the defendants, repre
sents in this Court's view ro mater ia 1 or each
of such a substantial nature that this Court
is persuaded the remedy sought [i.e., fcr-
feiture] is appropriate.
App. "F", p. 7 (emphasis added).
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Accord ing1y, the trial court's deci s ion was ta inted by
the eight a 1leged defaults that shouId not have been
cons ide red . Under da_ck _B_!__ Parson Construction Co .__y_. State of
Utah, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 1986), when an appellate court cannot
determine whether the trial court's decision was based on
proper or improper grounds, the correct course of action is to
remand for a new trial, rat her than for the appei 1. at. e court to
decide the issue itself.
III.
THE COURT OE APPEALS IGNORED PRIOR DECISIONS BY
THIS COURT THAT WHERE A PARTY TO A CONTRACT
RESERVES A RIGHT OF CONSENT, THAT PARTY IS
REQUIRED TO GIVE ITS CONSENT UNLESS IT HAS A
REASONABLE AND GOOD FAITH BASTS FOR WITHHOLDING
CONSENT.
Although at page 6 of its Op inion, the Cou rt of
Appeals acknowledges the implied contractual covenant of good
faith, cooperation and fair dealing, the Cou rt goes on to state
However, there is no violation of the duty
of good faith, as a matter of law, when a
party is simply exercising its contractual
rights.
Thus, the? Court appears to be implying that where the consent
ot a party is required by contract, that party may 'withhold
consent for a good reason, a bad icason, or no reason at all.
If so, the Cour t of Appea1s has over 1ooked this Court's
deci s ion in Pri nee v . Elm Inv . Co ., Incm_, 64 9 P. 2d 820 (Utah
1982), holding that, based upon the implied covenant ot good
faith, consent cannot be withheld arbitrarily.
The? Court of Appeals also indicates that, the Manivest
request for consent was untimely. However, that tequesf Was
-18-
a imost simultaneous with the Va I .cy Hank t. ransact ion a* issue .
The assignment document is dated Dectstber 8, 1987 (Ex. 17), and
the Manivest letter requesting consent is dated Januai'. 22,
1988 (Ex. 8) . If the Howes had no reasonable basis f>- :
withholding consent prior to the transaction, the fac that the
request for consent occurred shortly after the transac* ion
shou1d g ive them no additional basis for withhoIding c nsenr ,
except as another technicality. Manivest was net seer. :ng
"compelled condonation" (Opinion, p. 6), but only the :ai:
treatment that the implied covenant of good faith requires.
More importantly, the Court of Appea is over 1 ked that
if would have been futile for Manivest to request con; •uit pi ior
to the transaction, and that where a tender of per for: .nee is
futile, that performance is excused. Kreger v. Ha 11, ;25 P .2d
638, 643 (Wash. 1967). As the Howes made clear, both in the
trla i court (App . "G" , If If 17 and 18; Tr .6-8 , App . "N" ) oid on
appea 1 (App . "L" , pp . 36-37), even l: the ir objection •r flie
form of t.he consent document had be eon resolved, they no
intention of giving consent absent •enegot iat ion of t> .. rental
amount. Since nothing in the lease gave the? Howes tht right to
condition consent on an increase in rental, they we re .ot, as
trie Court of Appea Is suggests , mere .y "exerci s irig core •actual
rights". Instead, they were acting in bad faith.
- 1 q _
CONvCLU_SI_ON
By interpr et ing the lease median ist ica 1:y rat tier than
realistically, the Court of Appeals Opinion exalted form over-
substance and rewrote the 1aw of forfeiture. Unless certiorar
is granted and that dec is ion overturned, the preeiedent c rea ted
will turn the law of contrajoLs and ot forfeiture on its head.
DATED this i_J day ot June, 1992.
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BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Professional Manivest, Inc. (Manivest) appeals from a
judgment by the trial court arising out of breach of lease. The
trial court awarded damages, attorney fees, costs and expenses.
We affirm..
FACTS
On October 15, 1960, J. E. Lefmherr, Herman L. Franks, and
Stanford L. Hale (as partners doing business as Valley Shopping
Center) leased land in Salt Lake County from Earl E. Howe, John
(0. Howe, Vivian Howe, and Maxine W. Howe (the Howes)1 under the
terms of a fifty-year ground lease. The lessees had a fifteen-
year option to purchase the property under the lease. The
lessees were also prohibited from making any assignments except
to a corporation that would be organized to build the shopping
center. The partners of Valley Shopping Center assigned the
lease to Soutnlake Shopping Center, Inc., Manivest's predecessor-
in-interest. When the option to purchase expired in October
1975, only certain portions of the leased property had been
bought, leaving other parts subject to the lease without a
purchase option.
In December 1987, Manivest sought a $4 million loan from
Valley Bank & Trust Company (Valley Bank), and assigned the
ground lease as well as the rents from all tenant subleases to
Valley Bank. As security, Manivest also executed and recorded a
deed of trust in favor of Valley Bank. After the trust deed had
been executed, delivered, and recorded, Manivest sought the
consent of the Howes to the assignment by sending them an
"acknowledgement." The Howes refused to consent to the
assignment, specifically objecting to language of the
acknowledgement that would have subordinated their interest to
Valley Bank.
The undersigned acknowledges that the
Lessee is encumbering their interest in the
property and said loan is hereby approved as
required by said lease.
The Howes thereupon demanded that Manivest remove the trust
deed, and served Manivest a notice of default by a letter dated
March 30, 1988. As grounds for default, the letter cited that
Manivest was in breach of
1. The covenant to keep the premises
free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances2;
1. The trial court found that co-plaintiffs John O. Howe; Robert
E. Howe and Bonnie F. Howe; William K. Evans and Carole H. Evans;
and Judith H. Steenblik are successors-in-interest to the
original lessors.
2. The Howes also discovered that Manivest had earlier recorded
trust deeds on the property in 1978 and 1982 to secure other
loans. The Howes also learned that Manivest had quitclaimed real
property to Wallaby Enterprises in 1983. Although the loans were
paid and the trust deeds released when the obligations were
(continued...)
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2. The covenant not to assign the Lease
without (the lessor's] prior written consent;
and
3. The covenant to maintain the
premises and to keep them free from weeds and
other obnoxious growth.
Manivest failed to cure the conditions complained of, and
the Howes sent Manivest a second notice of default on April 29,
198 8. When the conditions remained unchanged, the Howes served
Manivest a notice of termination on May 31, 1988, demanding that
Manivest surrender the property. Manivest refused to vacate the
premises. Before receiving the termination notice, Manivest had
assigned its interest in the lease to a trust, again unbeknownst
to the Howes, to liquidate all assets, including the Soutnlake
Shopping Center for the benefit of creditors on April 28, 1988.
In September 1988, Manivest apparently removed some, but not
all of the encumbrances. The Howes thereupon filed a complaint
against Manivest in November 1988 on the ground that the
assignments and encumbrances violated the lease. The Howes also
complained that Manivest's failure to maintain the property
constituted an additional lease violation. Manivest
counterclaimed that the Howes had no valid reason for withholding
their consent to the assignment and, therefore, acted in bad
faith. While the case was still pending, Murray City notified
Manivest on July 10, 1989, that weeds growing on the property
violated a city ordinance.
The trial court found that Manivest had executed, delivered,
and recorded a trust deed on the leased property and maoo an
assignment of the lease in favor of Valley Bank. The trial court
also found that weed growth and other lease violations were
substantial, and when taken together with the assignments and
encur.orances, constituted a material breach of the lease. The
trial court dismissed Manivest's counterclaim, and ruled that
Manivest had "forfeited" its interest in the leasehold estate to
the Howes. The trial court then ordered possession, and entered
judgment in favor of the Howes in the amount of $24,489.50 as
"liquidated" damages for Manivest's continued use of the
2 . (...continued)
satisfied, none of the transactions had been entered into with
the Howes' knowledge or consent. Inasmuch as the acts complained
of in the Howes' March 1988 default letter support a claim, for
breach of contract, we do not address the legal effect, if any,
of the earlier transactions.
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property, $16,231.05 in related costs and expenses, and
$131,867.55 in attorney fees.
LEASE
A. Standard of Review
Interpretation of an "unambiguous, integrated contract is a
question of law, which is reviewed on appeal for correctness."
Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989). A
cardinal rule in construing a contract is to give effect to the
intentions of the parties and, if possible, to glean those
intentions "from an examination of the text of the contract
itself." LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858
(Utah 1988). "It is a long-standing rule in Utah that persons
dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own
terms without the intervention of the courts to relieve either
party from the effects of a bad bargain." Hal Taylor Assocs. v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).
B. Covenant Against Encumbrances
Manivest contends that the Valley Bank trust deed did not
encumber the Howes' reversionary fee interest because Manivest
could not have pledged more than its own leasehold estate to
Valley Bank. Manivest argues that the trial court erred in
determining tnat the Valley Bank trust deed was a breach of the
covenant against encumbrances. The lease required the lessee,
however, "to keep the demised premises free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances of any nature whatsoever." The lease
prohibition against all encumbrances of any nature encompasses
each and every encumbrance. Manivest breached the lease by
recording the trust deed, therefore, because the trust deed not
only encumbered Manivest's leasehold interest in the demised
premises, but also purported to encumber the Howes' fee interest.
Accordingly, we reject the argument that legal impossibility is a
defense to breach of a lease covenant against encumbrances.
The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866 (Utah 1979). In Brewer, the
grantors of a warranty deed argued that a lien in favor of an
improvement district did not legally encumber real property
because the lien did not attach until after an ordinance levying
assessment for the improvements came into effect. Id. at 868.
Despite the argument that the property was not legally
encumbered, the court held the grantors liable for breach of the
covenant against encumbrances. The court reasoned that the
property was encumbered because the existence of the improvements
was either known to the grantors or was discoverable from the
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record by the lien filed. id. Whether the lien was legally
enforceable was thus immaterial to the court's analysis of
whether the lien encumbered the property in Brewer. Likewise,
whether the Valley Bank trust deed is legally enforceable is
immaterial to whether Manivest breached the covenant against
encumbrances.
In Brewer, the Utah Supreme Court defined an "encur.orance"
as "any right that a third person holds in land which constitutes
a burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee title holder."
Id. The Valley Bank trust deed burdened the Howes' fee interest
until it was removed from the record because it purported to
limit their rights. Manivest breached the lease covenant against
encumbrances, therefore, by recording the trust deed regardless
of its legal effect.
C. Covenant Against Assignment
Manivest contends that its assignment of the lease to Valley
3ank was not a breach of the covenant against assignment.
Manivest argues that a valid assignment could not have been
legally effected without the Howes' consent inasmuch as the lease
was, by its terms, unassignable. The lease prohibition against
assignment is as follows:
4. Lessees shall have the right to
assign this Lease and Option to purchase to a
corporation to be formed for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of this Agreement.
Such assignment shall not release the Lessee
of any liabilities hereunder. Except as to
the assignment permitted pursuant to this
paragraph, this Lease shall be unassignable
except with the prior consent of the Lessors.
Provided, however, that the Lessees or their
assignee as herein provided shall have the
right to enter into subleases of portions of
the demised premises, provided, however, that
said subleases shall not attach to or become
binding in any way upon the fee interest of
the Lessors; that said Lessees shall be
limited to that class of business commonly
known as "retail trade and service."
(Emphasis added.)
The Howes agreed to assignment of the lease to a corporation
that would build the shopping center. Beyond the initial
assignment agreed to in the lease, however, the parties agreed
that the Howes' consent to any other future assignments would be
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required as a prior condition of assignment. Because it is the
mere act of assignment that constitutes a breach of the lease,
and not the legal effect of an assignment, we reject the argument
that the prohibition against assignment was limited to only those
assignments carrying some legal effect. Like other provisions of
the lease, the lease term against assignment is enforceable.
Manivest also argues, in the alternative, that the Howes
acted in bad faith by arbitrarily withholding their consent to
the assignment. In Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that
"there is implied in any contract a covenant of good faith and
cooperation, which should prevent either party from impeding the
other's performance of his obligations thereunder; and that one
party may not render it difficult or impossible for the other to
continue performance and then take advantage of the non
performance he has caused." However, there is no violation of
the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a party is
simply exercising its contractual rights. Heiner v. S.J. Groves
& Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 115 (Utah App. 1990).
The Howes were not obligated to consent to every proposed
assignment. Manivest's argument that the Howes could not
arbitrarily withhold their consent to an assignment of the lease
confuses the duty to seek their prior permission with compelled
condonation. Manivest assigned the lease to Valley Bank without
first seeking or obtaining the Howes' consent. The non
consensual assignment was not permitted by the lease. Manivest
breached the covenant against assignment, therefore, regardless
of the legal effect of an actual or purported transfer.
D. Duty to Maintain
Manivest argues that the lease imposed a duty to keep the
premises only "reasonably" free from weeds. The lease, however,
was silent as to the standard of maintenance to be applied:
5. Lessee agrees to be responsible for
the entire demised premises, and during the
term of the lease to maintain the same and
keep it free from weeds and other obnoxious
growth; that it will not allow any of its
lessees to conduct any business or perform
any act in violation of the ordinances
orregulations [sic] of Murrary [sic] City,
the laws of the State of Utah or the United
States Government.
(Emphasis added.)
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Manivest was cited by Murray City for growing weeds on the
property. Because the condition was a violation of Murray City
ordinance and Manivest allowed the condition to exist, Manivest
was in breach of the lease for failure to maintain the premises
free from weeds or obnoxious growth. If the parties intended
that maintenance would be governed by a reasonableness standard,
they should have included it in the contract. However, "[w]e
will not rewrite a contract to alleviate a contracting party's
mistake, but will construe it according to its terms as written."
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah App. 1990).
E. Remedy for Breach
The lease imposed a sixty-day cure period for breach of any
of the lease covenants, and further provided that the lease would
terminate automatically without notice if breach was ncz cured.
9. Should Lessees fail to pay the rent
herein reserved or make any of the other
payments or charges to be paid by them
hereunder or fail to keep any covenant herein
contained to be performed by Lessee, or
within sixty (60) days thereafter, then in
that event, without notice from the Lessors,
this Agreement shall cease and terminate, and
the Lessees shall surrender said premises to
the Lessor.
(Emphasis added.)
Manivest was notified of the breach of three lease
covenants, and had sixty days to cure the conditions complained
of. Manivest took no action to cure the defaults within that
time. The trial court, therefore, correctly determmea that the
lease terminated as a result of Manivest's breach.
As long as the lease remained "in full force and effect,"
the parties agreed that "[a]11 improvements placed upon said
demised premises shall remain the property of the Lessees." The
Howes, therefore, succeeded to the improvements on the property
upon termination. We have reviewed the remaining argurents
raised on appeal concerning the appropriateness of forfeiture.
Because the option to purchase had expired and the parties agreed
that the Howes would succeed to the improvements upon
termination, we deem them to be without merit. See State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989 •(appellate court not
required to analyze and address in writing each and every
argument, issue, or claim raised on appeal).
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Howes on
May 18, 1990, and awarded them fees, expenses and costs. The
trial court further directed that the amount of attorney fees and
costs "would be established by a supplemental judgment." The
Howes applied for fees, expenses and costs approximately five
weeks later. The trial court supplemented the earlier judgment
with specific amounts as to costs, expenses, and fees. On
appeal, Manivest challenges the award of attorney fees, expenses
and costs on the ground that the Howes did not make timely
application for them under Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Attorney fees may be awarded in Utah "only if authorized by
statute or contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,
988 (Utah 1988). The Howes were contractually entitled to an
award of a reasonable attorney fees under the lease executed in
1960 as follows
20. The Lessors and Lessees each agree
that should they default in any of the
covenants or agreements contained herein, the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's
fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing
this Agreement, or in obtaining possession of
the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing
any remedy provided hereunder or by the
statutes of the State of Utah whether such
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or
otherwise.
(Emphasis added.)
Under the express terms of the contract, the Howes are
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee, costs and expenses
incurred at trial and on appeal. See G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis,
773 P.2d 841, 846 (Utah App. 1989). Costs are also an
appropriate expense of litigation. Because the time limitation
of Rule 54(d)(2) does not apply to expenses or attorney fees, the
rule does not bar the award. The trial court's calculations were
supported by evidence in the record. See Dixie State Bank, 764
P. 2d at 988-89. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney
fees, costs, and expenses.
CONCLUSION
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Manivest breached the lease covenant to maintain the
premises as well as the covenants against assignment, and
encumbrances. The lease was terminated by Manivest's separate
breach cf three lease covenants. The Howes were thereby entitled
to possession of the premises and an award of attorney fees,
expenses and related costs.
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
I CONCUR:
/
Pameia T. Greenwood, Judge
I DISSENT:
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^r V., m*^ ^-_,.
Gregory ii^ Orme, Judge
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Ronald E. Nehring (2374)
James A. 3oevers (0371)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Appellants
City Centre I, Suite 900
17 5 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111
(801) 524-1000
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IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN O. HOWE, Trustee; ROBERT E.
HOWE and BONNIE F. HOWE, nusoand
and wife; WILLIAM K. EVANS and
CAROLE H. EVANS, husband and
wife, as Trustee; and JUDITH H .
STEENBLIK,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs .
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC. ,
a Utah corporation; and
MANIVEST CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants and Aooeliants.
Case No. 910L98-CA
MOTION, STIPULATION AND
ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR
FILING PETITION FTP REHEARING
MOTION
Pursuant to Rule 22, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Appellants hereby move tne Court for an Orcer
extending the time for filing their Petition for Rer.ea ring from
April 17, 1992, to April 24, 1992. The grounds for t.-.is Motion
are that this Court's Opinion issued on April 3, 1992, was not
received by the counsel for Appellants until April 6, 1992, and
•INCE. YEATES
QELDZAHLER
>nlr» f. Suit* 800
,»»t Fourth Soutn
jjit Lakf City
Ut»fi Brflti
S01) 524-1000
that after review of the Opinion and discussion between
Appellants and their counsel, a decision to file tne Petition
was not made until April 10, 1992. Accordingly, Appellants
require an additional week within whicn to file their
Petition. Appellants have not previously sought an extension
for f i 1 in q this Petition.
DATED this day of April, 1992.
PRINCE, YEATES t* GELDZAHLER
s A. Boevers
torneys for Appellants
STIPULATION
Appellants and Appellees hereby stipulate that the
time for filing Appellants' Petition be extended from April 17,
1992, to April 24, 1992.
DATED this day of April, 1992.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
J/Gm^s A. Boevers
orneys for Appellants
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
-i~
R. Carlston
Attorneys for Appellees
WINCE. YEATES
t QELDZAHLER
Centra I. Suit* 900
E»il Fourtfi South
Salt Lam City
• n 8*iti
i i 524 100C
ORDER
>aL
App3i«e
:•r*^ Court
•^ u, ior Appeals
Based upon tne foregoing Motion and Stipulation, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the time for filing Appellants' Petition
for Rehearing is extended from April 17, 1992, to April 24,
1992.
DATED this __l^T~oay of April, 1992.
3Y THE COURT: •--— ---,
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that, on tne /O day of April,
1992, I caused to oe hand-delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION, STIPULATION AND ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR
FILING PETITION FOR REHEARING to the following:
Michael R. Carlston
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 54145
9019G
041592
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of April, 1992, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Ronald E. Nehring
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
Attorneys at Law
175 East 400 South, #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael R. Carlston
Max D. Wheller
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Gerrit M. Steenblik
Jennings, Strouss & Salmon
Attorneys at Lav/
One Renaissance Square
Two North Central
Pheonix, Arizona 85004-2393
Dated this 21st day of April, 1992.
By - . . • T •/•'/-•-/:
Deputy Clerk
IN THE UTAH COURT OF API^-.->S
ooOoo
RLED
MAY141992
John 0. Howe, Trustee;
Robert E. Howe and Bonnie F.
Howe, husband and wife; William
K. Evans and Carole H. Evans,
husband and wife, as Trustee;
and Judith H. Steenblik,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,
v.
Professional Manivest, Inc.,
a Utah corporation; Manivest
Corporation, a Utah
corporaiion,
Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHg^fc^
Cterk of the Court
Utah Court ot Appeals
MAY 15'^ 2 C
I-nv •
Case No. 910598-CA
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed April 23, 1992,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
•////'
Dated this // -" day of May, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood* Judge
I dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing at
this juncture. I would call for a response.
GregoryynK. Orme, Judae
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of May, 1991, a true and
correct copy cf the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to the parties
listed below:
Ronald E. Nehring
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
Attorneys at Law
175 East 400 South, #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael R. Carlston
Max D. Wheller
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Gerrit M. Steenblik
Jennings, Strouss & Salmon
Attorneys at Law
One Renaissance Square
Two North Central
Pheonix, Arizona 85004-2393
Dated this 14th day of May, 1992.
By . • './
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF "SALT LA7CE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN 0. HOWE, Trustee, et al., JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE AND
ORDER OF POSSESSION
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC., a
Utah corporation, et al., Civil No. 880907595
Defendants.
/Z <- cj ***•£./ <,. ..
The above-entitled cause came on regularly for trial
commencing March 6, 1990, and continuing through March 7, 1990,
before The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. Plaintiffs were
represented by Michael R. Carlston and Max D. Wheeler of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, and the defendants were represented by
Ronald E. Nehring and Brian S. King of Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler. The Court, having previously made and entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of the
plaintiffs, and wherefore, by virtue of the law and by reason of
the aforesaid,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. The lease (herein the "Lease") between the parties
affects the following described real property and all
improvements located thereon (collectively, the "Property") in
Salt Lake County, Utah, to wit:
Parcel 1:
BEGINNING at a point on the South line of 5600 South Street, said
point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1589.02 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 0°14'30"
West 155 feet; thence North 89°49'35" West 31.07 feet; thence
South 66°00' West 433.52 feet; thence North 24°00' West 100.0
feet; thence South 66°00' West 35.0 feet; thence North 24°00'
West 100.0 feet; thence North 66°00' East 28.30 feet; thence
North 24°00' West 167.50 feet to the South line of 5600 South
Street; thence South 89°49'35" East 583.36 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
Parcel 2:
BEGINNING at a point on the West line of 900 East Street, said
point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 66°00' West
461.39 feet, more or less; thence North 24°00' West 485.00 feet;
thence North 66°00' East 508.62 feet; thence South 89°49,35" East
156.07 feet to the West line of 900 East Street; thence South
0°14'30" West 461.81 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
Parcel 3:
BEGINNING at a point of the West line of 900 East Street, said
point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 0°14'30"
West along said West line 429.66 feet; thence West 200.50 feet;
thence North 0°14'30" East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°00' West
58.86 feet; thence North 66°00' East 246.39 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
Parcel 4:
BEGINNING at a point East 1025 feet and North 265 feet from the
West quarter corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 499.5
feet; thence North 0°14,30n East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°00'
West 58.86 feet; thence South 66°00' West 215.2 feet, more or
less; thence North 24°00' West 485.0 feet; thence North 66°00'
East 75.1 feet, more or less, to the Westerly line of Parcel 1
above; thence along said Westerly line of Parcel 1, North 24°00'
West 100 feet; thence South 66°00' West 35 feet; thence North
24°00' West 100 feet; thence North 66°00' East 28.3 feet; thence
North 24°00' West 167.5 feet to the South line of 5600 South
Street; thence along South line of 5600 South Street North
89°49'35" West 155 feet, more or less; thence South 03°19' West
192 23 feet, more or less; thence South 89°49T35" East 127.52
feet more or less; thence South 24°00' East 677.76 feet, more or
less; thence South 85°51'30" West 229.12 feet; thence South
02°34' East 230 feet, more or less, to the point of BEGINNING.
Parcel 5:
Commencing at a point on the South line of 5600 South Street,
said point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1559.02 feet from
the Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, salt Lake Base and Meridian, Salt Lake County, Utah, and
running thence South 0°14'30" West 155 feet; thence South
89049'35" East 155 feet to the West line of 900 East Street;
thence North 0°14'30" East along the West line of 900 East Street
155 feet to the intersection of the West line of 900 East Street
and the South line of 5600 South Street; thence North 89°49'35"
West 155 feet along the South line of 5600 South Street to the
point of commencement.
2. The Lease was terminated effective June 1, 1988, and all
interest in said Lease was terminated on such date, and the
defendants have no further interest in the Lease or the Property.
3. The plaintiffs are awarded immediate possession of the
Property.
4. Defendants are ordered to immediately vacate the
Property in favor of plaintiffs, and plaintiffs are awarded all
rents and all other income from and after March 12, 1990, less
all necessary expenses incurred in management and operation of
the Property incurred prior to the time Judgment is entered.
5. Plaintiffs are awarded liquidated damages for
defendants' continued use of the Property to March 12, 1990 in
the amount of $24,489.50, together with prejudgment interest as
allowed by law.
f -• • r- f : -
6. Defendants' Counterclaim against plaintiffs and each
count thereof is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
7. Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees and costs in an
amount to be established by a supplemental judgment,
this \tfkkDATED Lay of May, 1990.
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
By ^^Udhit
Ronald E. Nehring
Attorneys for Defendants
BY THE COURT:
mMji
The tfoAor'ab/e/ J/. Dennis Frederick
Third jbist^ijct./Court Judge
:N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU^T--oVrS^^Tt"£A^E (fcCUNTY
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STATE OF UTAH
JOHN O. HOWE, Trustee, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs .
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC., a
Utah corporation, et al. ,
Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 880907595
rv
- . - t->
This case came on regularly for trial before the Court on
March 6, 1990, and again on March 7, 1990. Plaintiffs, John 0.
Howe, Trustee, Robert Howe, Bill Evans and Carole Evans were
present and all plaintiffs were represented by their counsel,
Michael R. Carlston and Max D. Wheeler of Snow, Christensen h
Martineau. The defendants were present and represented by their
counsel, Ronald E. Nehring and Brian S. King of Prince, Yeates k
Geldzahler. Witnesses were sworn. Testimony and other evidence
was considered and received into evidence by the Court. At the
conclusion of the evidence, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties, oral argument was waived and the parties agreed to
submit written summaries of their respective positions. such
summaries were presented by the parties on March 9, 1990.
The Court, having considered the summaries, the sworn
testimony of the witnesses and the other evidence presented, now
makes and enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs, John 0. Howe, Trustee; Robert E. Howe and
Bonnie F. Howe, husband and wife; William K. Evans and Carole H.
Evans, husband and wife, and Judith H. Steenblik, are the
successors-in-interest to John 0. Howe, Maxine Howe, Earl Howe
and Vivian Howe, as Lessors under a Lease and Option dated
October 14, 1960 (the "Lease").
2. Defendants are the successors-in-interest to the Lessees
under the Lease.
3. The Lease contained an option to purchase the real
property subject to the Lease. Pursuant to the terms of the
option, certain portions of the real property which was subject
to the Lease, were purchased and from thenceforth no longer
subject to the Lease.
4. The option in the Lease expired in October 1975, leaving
the below described real property and all of the improvements
then cr thereafter located thereon (collectively the "Property")
subject to the Lease, to wit:
Parcel 1:
BEGINNING at a point on the South line of 5600 South Street, said
point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1589.02 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 0°14'30"
West 155 feet; thence North 89°49'35" West 31.07 feet; thence
-2-
BEGINNING.
Parcel 2:
BEGINNING at a point on the West line of 900 East Street said
point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from .he
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South.Range *?s£;
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence SouthJ6°C0 West
461 39 feet more or less; thence North 24°00< west 485.OC feet;
thence North 66°00' East 508.62 feet; thence south 89^49',5 East
1*6 07 feet to the West line of 900 East Street; thence so.tn
0°14'30" West 461.81 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
Parcel 3:
BEGINNING at a point of the West line of 900 East street said
point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from he
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South Range _Eas.,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence s°u^ °»l- 3o
West along said West line 429.66 feet; thence West 200 5C' ^et,
thence North 0°14'30" East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°0- West
58.86 feet; thence North 66=00' East 246.39 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
Parcel 4:
BEGINNING at a point East 1025 feet and North 265 feet from the
wes:. quarter corner of Section 17, Township 2 South Range .
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence Eas 499
feet: thence North 0°14'30" East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°00
west 58.66 feet; thence South 66=00' West 215.2 feet more or
less; thence North 24°00' West 485.0 feet; thence No th 0
East 75.1 feet, more or less, to the westerly line of Par-el 1
above; thence along said Westerly line of Parcel 1 Nor. 24 00
west 100 feet- thence South 66°00' West 35 feet; thence No. n
24°00 West 100 feet; thence North 66°00' East 28.3 feet; thence
No-th 24°00' West 167.5 feet to the South line of 5600 S.ith
Stree- thence along South line of 5600 South Street Nor n90^:35' west 155 feet, more or less; thence South 030 -' West
19? 23 feet more or less; thence South 89°49'35" East 1.7.52
t more or s thence South 24o00' East 677 76 feet more or
less thence South 85°5r30" West 229.12 feet; thence South
02°34' East 230 feet, more or less, to the point of BE^.<N.W
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Parcel 5:
Commencing at a point on the south line of 5600 South Street,
said point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1559.02 feet from
the Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Salt Lake County, Utah, and
running thence South 0°14'30" West 155 feet; thence South
89°49,35" East 155 feet to the West line of 900 East Street;
thence North 0°14'30" East along the West line of 900 East Street
155 feet to the intersection of the West line of 900 East Street
and the South line of 5600 South Street; thence North 89°49'35'T
West 155 feet along the South line of 5600 South Street to the
point of commencement,
5. In September, 1983, defendants, without the plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, permitted encroachments on to the Property.
Exhibit "10".
6. In May of 1978, defendants, without the plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, executed, delivered and recorded a Trust
Deed on the Property and an assignment of the Lease and of all
tenant subleases in favor of First Security Bank. Exhibit "11".
7. In 1982, defendants, without the plaintiffs' knowledge
or consent, assigned the Lease and all tenant subleases to Valley
Bank Sl Trust ("Valley Bank"). Exhibits "12", "13" and "14".
8. In December of 1987, without the plaintiffs' knowledge
or consent, defendants assigned the Lease and all of the tenant
subleases to Valley Bank in connection with a $4,000,000 loan.
Exhibit "17".
9. In January of 1988, defendants, without the plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, executed, delivered and recorded a Trust
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Deed on the Property and an Assignment of the Lease in favor of
Valley Bank. Exhibits "17" and "18".
10. In January of 1988, pursuant to the terms and
conditions of the 1987-88 Valley Bank loan, Larry Leeper en
behalf of the defendants solicited the plaintiffs' consent to the
1987-88 Valley Bank loan. This request was made following the
execution, delivery and recording by the defendants of a Trust
Deed on the Property and an Assignment of the Lease in favor of
Valley Bank and following the assignment of all tenant subleases
to Valley Bank. Intentionally, or otherwise, the acknowledgement
submitted to the plaintiffs included language intended to cause
the plaintiffs' interest to be subordinated to the 1987-88 Valley
Bank loan. Exhibits "8", "17", "18" and "19". The action of the
defendants in making this request in the form proposed
constituted something less than good faith and fair dealing.
11. By letter dated March 30, 1988, the plaintiffs put the
defendants on notice that defendants were in default of covenants
and obligations under the Lease, and plaintiffs requested removal
of the aforementioned assignments to and encumbrances in favor of
Valley Bank and correction of the improper condition of the
Property. Exhibit "30".
12. The defendants received the March 30, 1988 notice and
did not take action to remedy the defaults as requested.
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13. The defendants also received an April 29, 1989 notice
from plaintiffs, as indicated in Exhibit "30", and still did
nothing to remedy the defaults.
14. Defendants' failure to remedy the continuing defaults
after receipt cf the March 30, 1988 and April 29, 1988 Notices
precipitated the service by plaintiffs of a Notice of Termination
dated May 31, 1988. Exhibit "31".
15. Defendants received the Notice of Termination on June
1, 1988.
16. Defendants made no affirmative response to plaintiffs'
demands regarding the condition of the Property until late July
of 1988. Exhibits "28" and "32".
17. Defendants made no affirmative response to plaintiffs'
request that the Valley Bank assignments and encumbrances be
removed until September 1 and September 22, 1988, some five
months following the plaintiffs' request, when certain of the
encumbrances were released. Exhibit "33".
18. At the time of trial, all of the tenant subleases had
been purportedly assigned to Valley Bank.
19. Defendants, on three separate occasions, entered into
agreements called Purchase and Sale Agreements without the
knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs. These agreements
purported to sell the defendants' interest to MD Investments
Limited Partnership on February 1, 1976; from MD Investments
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Limited Partnership to Westco Realty, Inc. on January 1, 1978;
and from Westco Realty, Inc. to Diversified Realty Limited
Partnership on January 1, 1978. Exhibit "22".
20. On or about April 28, 1988, without plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, defendants assigned their interest m the
Lease to a liquidating trust. Exhibits M21" and "40". The
Liquidating Trust was expressly established to liquidate all
assets, including the Soutnlake Shopping Center situated on the
Property, for the benefit of creditors.
21. Defendants received two separate notices of viciation
of Murray City ordinances on April 21, 1983, as evidenced by
Exhibit "23", and on July 10, 1989, as evidenced by Exhibit "37".
These notices pertain to improper conditions of the Property with
respect to the weeds, debris and other environmental matters
associated with the Property.
22. Said improper conditions on the Property continued
after the aforementioned notices from Murray City, or were
allowed to reoccur on multiple occasions, including after
plaintiffs served notice of intent to terminate the Lease.
Exhibits "26" and "28".
23. Defendants, directly or through their tenants, allowed
health and safety violations to occur and continue on the
Property through the present, including, but not limited to,
electrical violations, disrepair of the parking lot, exposed
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mechanical equipment, sagging roof, improperly supported gas
line, loose debris on the roof, broken windows, water
accumulating by electrical lines and excess water accumulation,
and exterior electrical outlets not waterproofed, as evidenced by
the testimony of Architects Robert P. Leonard and Judge Hawks.
Exhibit "39" .
24. Underground storage tanks located on a portion of the
Property, whLch has been subleased by defendants, have not been
registered as required by law.
25. All of the foregoing facts represent lease violations,
with the principal violations pertaining to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6
of the Lease. These violations, separately and together, were
material breaches of the Lease and were of a substantial nature.
These breaches of the Lease, particularly the breaches regarding
assignments, encumbrances and other related lease terms were and
are of such primary importance to the plaintiffs, that plaintiffs
would not have entered into the Lease had they been aware
defendants would breach these terms.
26. Conflicting evidence was offered pertaining to the
value of the defendants's leasehold estate. The most credible
and believable evidenced was provided by witness Charles Huber,
CP.A. and Exhibit "42". This evidence establishes that the
current value of the defendants' leasehold estate is between
$500,000 and $600,000. The Lease expressly provides for a
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forfeiture cf the Property, including, but not limited to the
improvements, at the end of the term or upon the earlier
expiration of the Lease by reason of default.
27. Taking into account that the provisions of the Lease
are to be strictly construed against the parties seeking
forfeiture and considering all of the facts and circumstances
according to the applicable standard of proof, including, hut not
limited to, the materiality of the defendants' defaults, the harm
caused to plaintiffs by defendants' defaults, the value of the
defendants' leasehold estate, the fair market value of the
Property and the reasonable rental value thereof, the willful and
persistent nature of the defendants' defaults, the defendants'
failure to respond to the notice of default, the fact that the
Lease itself contemplates forfeiture and that the Lessor will
succeed to the ownership of the improvements, and the defendants'
conduct m seeking the plaintiffs' consent to the 1987-68 Valley
Bank loan, this court is persuaded that the value of the
defendants' leasehold estate is not so excessive as to be
entirely disproportionate to any loss that might have beer.
contemplated. Such aresult does not shock the conscience of the
Court and is not unconscionable.
28. Plaintiffs' Notice of Termination, Exhibit "31"
complies with the terms of the Lease insofar as required m order
to forfeit the defendants' interest in the Lease.
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29. Although defendants asserted as a counterclaim that
Plaintiffs breached their duty of fair dealing, defendants
provided no credible evidence in support of this counterclaim.
30. Although defendants asserted as a counterclaim that
Plaintiffs had a duty to consent to the assignment of the Lease
to Valley Bank for the 1987-88 loan arrangement, defendants
provided no credible evidence in support of this counterclaim.
31. The Lease provides under certain circumstances for the
awarding of expenses and attorneys' fees, and this action falls
within the terms of the Lease requiring the award to plaintiffs
of attorneys' fees and costs for bringing this action.
The Court, having made its findings of fact, now makes and
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendants have defaulted on their covenants and
obligations under the Lease.
2. The defendants' defaults set forth in the foregoing
Findings of Fact are material, in that the plaintiffs would not
have entered into the Lease unless the provisions which the
defendants violated had been included m the Lease.
3. The Lease expressly provides for forfeiture of the
defendants' leasehold estate upon default.
10-
4. Plaintiffs have complied with all conditions required by
the Lease and by law in order to forfeit all of the right, title
and interest of defendants in the Lease.
5. Ail interest of the defendants as the owners of the of
the Lessee's interest in the Lease was forfeited effective ;une
!, 1988, and defendants' possession of the Property should be
terminated.
6. Taking into account that the provisions of the Lease are
to be strictly construed against the parties seeking forfeiture
and considering all of the facts and circumstances according to
•he applicable standard of proof, including, but not limited to,
the materiality of the defendants' defaults, the value cf the
defendants' leasehold estate, the fair market value of tr.e
Property and the reasonable value thereof, the harm caused to the
pla<r*i<fs by the defendants' defaults, the willful and
Persistent nature of the defendants' defaults, the defendants'
failure to timely respond to notice of default, that the Lease
itsel£ contemplates aforfeiture with the Lessor succeeding to
^e movements and the defendants' conduct in seeking the
plaintiffs' consent to the 1987-88 Valley Bank loan arrangement
on adocument which, if signed, would have amended material terms
of the Lease and may have subordinated plaintiffs' fee interest
m the Property to the Valley Bank loan, the value of the
defendants' leasehold estate is not such that forfeiture is so
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excessive as to be entirely disproportionate to any loss that
might have been contemplated. Such a result does not shock the
conscience of the Court and is not unconscionable. There is no
reason that the contractual result agreed and contemplated by the
parties should be prevented from occurring.
7. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to have forfeited to
them all of the defendants' interest of whatever kind or nature,
including, but not limited to, defendants' interest in the Lease,
the Property and all improvements thereon.
8. The defendants' leasehold estate and the Lease should be
forfeited and terminated as of the effective date of the
forfeiture notice, to wit: June 1, 1988.
9. The plaintiffs are entitled to all rents and other
income attributable from the Property from March 12, 1990
forward.
10. Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages for the
defendants' continued use of the Property to March 12, 1990 in
the amount of S24,489.50, together with prejudgment interest as
allowed by law.
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment of forfeiture and
an order granting immediate possession of the Property.
12. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable
-12-
attorneys' fees and expenses as provided by contract, such
amounts to be determined by the Court.
DATED this day of May, 1990.
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Ronald E. Nehring
Brian S. King
Attorneys for Defendants
• Tll,*»^^1
BY THE CpURT:
The /'Hdriora
Th,iriv Di^XJ^ct// Court Judge
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J. Dfinnis Frederick
1 MONDAY, MARCH 12. 1990
3 THE COURT: THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR RULING IN
4 THE MATTER OF JOHN O. HOWE, ETC., VERSES PROFESSIONAL
5 MANIVEST, INC., ETC., CASE #C-88-7595. I NOTE COUNSEL ARE
6 PRKSENT.
7 AT THI-: CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL IN THIS MATTER,
0 THIS COURT TOOK UNDER ADVISEMENT ITS RULING TO ENABLE ME
9 Til!': nnmii-K OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE the EXHIBITS that wfrf
in KFCKIVKD, PI.LADINGS AND THE TESTIMONY ELICITED. THIS COURT
11 HAS NOW DONE SO. AND MOREOVER, I HAVE RECEIVED AND
12 RKVIK.WKD THE RESHKCTIVK MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED HY MOTH SIDES
13 BEARING UPON THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE, WHICH WERE SUBMITTED
14 IN LIEU OF CLOSING ARGUMENT.
15 PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION SEEK A DETERMINATION
16 UNDER DEFENDANT'S BREACH IN VARIOUS PARTICULARS: THE LEASE
17 AND OPTION AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1960, EXHIBIT 1,
18 BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND/OR THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST.
19 PLAINTIFFS SEEK IN ADDITION A DETERMINATION THAT THE
20 APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SUCH BREACHES IS FORFEITURE OF THE
21 DEFENDANT'S LEASEHOLD INTEREST. THESE ALLEGED BREACHES
22 FALL GENERALLY INTO THREE CATEGORIES.
23 NO. 1: BREACH OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF EXHIBIT 1,
24 WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT THIS LEASE SHALL BE
25 UNASSIGNABLE, EXCEPT WITH PRIOR CONSENT OF THE LESSORS BY
CREED H. BARKER, CSR FyVjjRlT "D '
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1 DEFENDANTS ASSIGNING ITS LEASEHOLD INTEREST.
2 NO. 2: BREACH OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF EXHIBIT 1,
3 WHICH STATES, "LESSEE SHALL AGREE TO KEEP THE DEMISE
4 PREMISES FREE AND CLEAR OF ALL LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES OF
5 ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER."
6 NO. 3: BREACH OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF EXHIBIT 1,
7 "WHEREIN THE LESSEE AGREED TO MAINTAINED THE DEMISED
8 PREMISES AND KEEP IT FREE FROM WEEDS AND OTHER NOXIOUS
9 GROWTH, AND NOT PERFORM ANY ACT IN VIOLATION OF THE
10 ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS OF MURRAY CITY, LAWS OF THE STATE
11 OF UTAH OR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT."
12 THE DEFENDANTS DENY THE ALLEGED BREACHES, BUT
13 CLAIM IF INDEED THE BREACHES OCCURRED, THEY WERE TECHNICAL
14 AND NCNMATERIAL ONLY, RESULTING IN NO DAMAGE TO THE
15 PLAINTIFFS. THE DEFENDANTS FURTHER CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFFS
16 BREACHED THE LEASE BY REFUSING WITHOUT JUST CAUSE TO GRANT
17 PERMISSION FOR ASSIGNMENT OF DEFENDANT'S LEASEHOLD
18 INTEREST, AND FURTHER THAT PLAINTIFFS BREACHED THEIR
19 IMPLIED COVENANT OF FAIR DEALING AND GOOD FAITH.
20 THIS COURT IS COGNIZANT OF THE DISFAVOR WITH
21 WHICH THE WAY OUR COURTS VIEW FORFEITURE AND THEY ARE TO BE
22 STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THOSE SEEKING SUCH REMEDY."
23 MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION VERSES ULTRA SYSTEMS WESTERN
24 CONSTRUCTORS, 767 P2D 125, A UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
25 DECISION, 1980, AND RUSSEL VS. PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION,
CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1 548 P2D 889, A 1976 CASE. "BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE PARTIES ARE
2 FREE TO CONTRACT ACCORDING TO THEIR DESIRES IN WHATEVER
3 TERMS THEY CAN AGREE UPON. AND FURTHER THAT THE CONTRACT
4 SHOULD BE ENFORCED ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS UNLESS THAT
5 RESULT IS SO UNCONSCIONABLE THAT A COURT OF EQUITY WOULD
6 REFUSE TO ENFORCE IT." JACOBSON VS. SWAN, 278 P2D 294, A
7 1954 CASE AND PERKINS VS. SPENCER, 243 P2D 446, 1952.
8 "A PARTIES' RIGHT TO CONTRACT SHOULD NOT BE
9 LIGHTLY INTERFERED WITH. IT IS ONLY WHEN THE FORFEITURE
10 AS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACTS WOULD BE SO GROSSLY
11 EXCESSIVE TO BE ENTIRELY DISPROPORTIONATE TO ANY POSSIBLE
12 LOSS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONTEMPLATED TO ENFORCE IT, WOULD
13 SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE OF A COURT OF EQUITY. IT HAS BEEN
14 HELD THAT AS FAR AS RESCISSION IS CONCERNED IT SHOULD NOT
15 BE GRANTED WITHOUT A MATERIAL BREACH, WHICH HAS BEEN
16 DEFINED AS ONE OF SUCH PRIME IMPORTANCE THAT THE CONTRACT
17 WOULD NOT BE MADE IF DEFAULT IN THAT PARTICULAR HAD BEEN
18 CONTEMPLATED. POLYGLYCOAT VS. STEVEN HOLCOMB, 591 P2D
19 449, 1979. IN THIS CASE THE EVIDENCE HAS ESTABLISHED TO
20 THIS COURT'S SATISFACTION THE FOLLOWING:
21 NO. 1: THE DEFENDANT'S CONVEYED BY QUITCLAIM
22 DEED TO WALBY ENTERPRISES SEPTEMBER 1, 1983, A STRIP OF
23 LAND, PART OF THE LEASE PREMISES OF 677 FEET BY 244 FEET IN
24 DIMENSION, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR THE CONSENT OF THE
25 PLAINTIFFS AS REPRESENTED BY EXHIBIT 10. THE QUITCLAIM
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1 DEED CONTAINED WITHIN EXHIBIT 10 WAS RECEIVED BY
2 STIPULATION OF COUNSEL.
3 NO. 2: THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED TO VALLEY BANK
4 AND TRUST ITS INTEREST, THEIR INTEREST IN THE LEASE ON MAY
5 21, 1982, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR THE CONSENT OF THE
6 PLAINTIFFS, EXHIHITS 12 AND 13.
7 NO. 3: THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED AND EXECUTED A
fl TRUST DEED TN FAVOR OF FIRST SECURITY BANK, THEIR INTEREST
9 IN THE LEASE ON MAY 18, 1978, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR
10 CONSENT OF THE DEFENDANTS. EXHIBIT 11.
j] NO. 4: THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED AND GRANTED A
12 TRUST DEED TO VALLEY HANK AND TRUST, THEIR INTEREST IN THE
13 LEASE ON DECEMBER 8, 1987, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT
14 OF THE PLAINTIFFS, EXHIBITS 17 AND 18.
15 NO. 5: WHEN DEFENDANTS AGENT LEAPER (SIC)
16 SOUGHT RATIFICATION AND APPROVAL FROM THE PLAINTIFFS ON
17 JANUARY 22ND, 1988, HE FAILED INTENTIONALLY OR OTHERWISE TO
18 ADVISE THE PLAINTIFFS THE LANGUAGE OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
19 OF ASSIGNMENT HE SOUGHT PLAINTIFF'S APPROVAL OF, HAD BEEN
20 MODIFIED TO INCLUDE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT NOT REQUESTED BY THE
21 BANK; THAT THE PLAINTIFFS AGREED THE ASSIGNMENT WAS QUOTE:
22 "ENCUMBERING THEIR INTEREST", UNQUOTE. EXHIBITS 8, 17 AND
23 19.
24 THIS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED SOMETHING LESS THAN
25 GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. THE PLAINTIFFS OBJECTED AND
0^-
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1 DEMANDED THE ASSIGNMENT AND TRUST DEED WERE IN VIOLATION OF
2 THE LEASE BY LETTER OF MARCH 30, 1988, EXHIBIT 30. YET THE
3 CONVEYANCE OF THE TRUST DEED AND THE RELEASE OF ASSIGNMENT
4 WERE NOT OBTAINED UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1 OF '88, ON SEPTEMSER
5 22ND OF '88, RESPECTIVELY. EXHIBIT 33.
6 SOME FIVE MONTHS AFTER PLAINTIFFS CONSIDERED
7 SUCH ACTION VIOLATIVE OF THE LEASE TERMS, TO THIS DATE
8 TENANT LEASES ARE STILL ASSIGNED.
9 NO. 6: DEFENDANTS EXECUTED THREE SEPARATE
10 PURCHASE AND SELL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AND AMONG NATIONAL
11 REALTY LIMITED TO M.D. INVESTMENTS LIMITED FEBRUARY 1,
12 1976; M.D. INVESTMENTS TO WESTCO REALTY INC., JANUARY 1,
13 1978; AND WESTCO REALTY INC. TO DIVERSIFIED REALTY, LIMITED
14 JANUARY 1, 1978, PURPORTING TO SELL DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN
15 THE LEASEHOLD PROPERTY WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF
16 THE PLAINTIFFS. EXHIBIT 22.
17 NO. 7: THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED THEIR INTEREST
38 IN THE LEASE TO THE MANIVEST, MANIVEST LIQUIDATING TRUST,
19 APRIL 28, 1988, WITHOUT THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OR KNOWLEDGE OR
20 CONSENT OF PLAINTIFFS. EXHIBITS 21 AND 40.
21 PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED TWO NOTICES IN VIOLATION OF
22 THE MURRAY CITY ORDINANCES, OR NOTICES OF VIOLATION OF
23 MURRAY CITY ORDINANCES APRIL 21, 1983, WHICH IS EXHIBIT 23,
24 AND JULY 10, 1989, WHICH IS 20 AND 34, FOR THE DEFENDANTS
25 HAVING ALLOWED WEEDS AND WASTE MATERIAL TO ACCUMULATE ON
P
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61 THE PROPERTY, WHICH CONDITIONS CONTINUED OR WERE ALLOWED TO
2 OCCUR AGAIN EVEN AFTER THE TERMINATION EFFORT OF THE LEASE
3 NOTICE OF MAY 31, 1988, AND APPEAR IN EXHIBITS 28 AND 26.
4 DEFENDANTS, CONTRARY TO TERMS, PARAGRAPH 5 OF
5 THE LEASE, ALLOWED EITHER THEMSELVES OR THROUGH THEIR
6 TENANTS, CONDITIONS IN VIOLATION OF PERTINENT HEALTH AND
7 SAFETY CODES OR REGULATIONS TO EXIST. EXAMPLES:
8 ELECTRICAL OUTLETS WITHOUT COVERS, EXPOSED MECHANICAL
9 EQUIPMENT, EXTFRTOR ELECTRICAL OUTLETS NOT WATERPROOF,
If) SAOGING ROOF, IMPROPER SUPPORT OF GAS LINE, LOOSE DEBRIS ON
11 THE ROOF, DISREPAIR OF THE PARKING LOT, BROKEN WINDOW,
12 EXCESSIVE WATER ACCUMULATION ALLOWING FREEZING POTENTIAL.
13 EXHIBIT 39. AND THIS IS SUPPORTED BY EXHIBIT 39 AND THE
14 TESTIMONY OF THE ARCHITECTS, JUD HAWKS AND ROBERT LEONARD.
15 THE DEFENDANTS ALSO FAILED TO REGISTER WITH THE STATE OF
16 UTAH THE UNDERGROUND GAS STORAGE TANKS.
17 DEFENDANTS WERE GIVEN NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S
18 POSITION REGARDING THE DEFAULTS ON OR ABOUT MARCH 30, 1988
19 -- EXHIBIT 30 -- WHEN IT CAME TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTENTION.
20 CERTAINLY THOUGH BY NO MEANS ALL OF THE ASSIGNMENTS HAD
21 TAKEN PLACE, YET THE DEFENDANTS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED A
22 NO VIOLATION POSTURE, RATHER THAN ADDRESS THE DEFAULTS.
23 FURTHER NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO DEFENDANTS ON APRIL
24 29, 1988 — EXHIBIT 30 -- GIVEN DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO
25 REMEDY THE SITUATION. PLAINTIFFS SERVED THE NOTICE OF
CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1 TERMINATION. EXHIBIT 31.
2 THE FOREGOING RECITATION OF FACTS PROVED IN THIS
3 CASE IN THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT REPRESENTS VIOLATIONS OF THE
4 LEASE TERMS, IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS 4, 5 AND 6: THE
5 CUMULATIVE EFFECT AND CAUSE OF THE COURSE OF CONDUCT BY THE
6 DEFENDANTS, REPRESENTS IN THIS COURT'S VIEW A MATERIAL
7 BREACH OF SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL NATURE THAT THIS COURT IS
8 PERSUADED THE REMEDY SOUGHT IS APPROPRIATE. THIS COURT IS
9 PERSUADED THAT THE BREACHED TERMS, PARTICULARLY THOSE
10 PROHIBITING ASSIGNMENTS, ENCUMBRANCES AND LEASES ARE OF
11 SUCH PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS THEY WOULD HAVE
12 NOT ENTERED TNTO THE LEASE HAD THEY BEEN AWARE DEFENDANTS
13 WOULD VIOLATE SAID TERMS.
14 THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE PRESENT ADJUSTED
15 VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD IS BETWEEN 500 AND $600,000,
16 PURSUANT TO EXHIBIT 42, AND THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS.
17 THIS IS THE MORE BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE. THE LEASE
18 CONTEMPLATES THAT AT THE EXPIRATION OF ITS TERM THE
19 FORFEITURE OF THE REVERSIONARY INTEREST AND IMPROVEMENTS
20 WOULD OCCUR. THIS VALUE, WHATEVER IT MAY BE, IS AN
21 OFFSETTING VALUE TO THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD.
22 GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS COURT'S VIEW IS THE
23 FORFEITURE IS NOT SO GROSSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO BE ENTIRELY
24 DISPROPORTIONATE TO ANY LOSS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
25 CONTEMPLATED.
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1 THIS COURT IS MOREOVER OF THE VIEW THAT THE
2 PLAINTIFF'S LETTER OF TERMINATION DATED MAY 31, 1988 —
3 EXHIBIT 31 — COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS OF THE LEASE AND WAS
4 EFFECTIVE. DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IS ACCORDINGLY TERMINATED
5 OR FORFEITED AS OF MAY 31, 1988. ALL SUMS PAID THEREAFTER
f, BY THE DEFENDANTS ARE TO BE RETAINED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AS
7 FAIR RENTAL LIQUIDATED DAMAGE VALUE FOR THE DEFENDANTS
8 CONTINUED OCCUPANCY SINCE THE DATE OF FORFEITURE.
9 NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN ELICITED TO
10 SUPPORT THE COUNTERCLAIM THAT THE PLAINTIFFS BREACHED ANY
11 OBLIGATION OF FAIR DEALING AND GOOD FAITH, OR THAT THE
12 PLAINTIFFS ARBITRARILY WITHOUT JUST CAUSE REFUSED TO EXCEED
13 TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ANY ASSIGNMENTS;
14 ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT FINDS NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE
15 COUNTER CLAIM. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE GRANTED REASONABLE
16 ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR THE NECESSITY OF BRINGING THIS
17 ACTION. COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS ARE TO PREPARE THE
18 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF
19 FORFEITURE AND TO SUBMIT BY AFFIDAVIT THEIR CLAIM FOR
20 ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO RULE 4501.
21 COUNSEL, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? VERY WELL,
22 THIS COURT WILL BE IN RECESS.
23
24
25
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"^ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAK^ COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN O. HOWE, Trustee, ROBERT
E. HOWE and BONNIE F. HOWE,
husband and wife; WILLIAM K.
EVANS and CAROLE H. EVANS,
husband and wife, as Trustee;
and JUDITH H. STEENBLIK,
Plaintiffs,
vs .
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST INC., a
Utah corporation; PROFESSIONAL
MANIVEST, INC., a Utah
corporation, as Trustee;
MANIVEST CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation and JOHN DOES 1
through 10,
Defendants.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
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Plaintiffs complain of defendants and allege as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiff, John 0. Howe is the Trustee of the John O.
Howe and Maxine Howe Family Trust of June 6, 1988, and is a
resident of Washington County, Utah.
2. Plaintiffs, William K. Evans and Carole H. Evans are
husband and wife, are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and
are the Trustees of the William K. Evans and Carole H. Evans
Family Trust of August 12, 1985.
3. Plaintiffs, Robert E. Howe and Bonnie F. Howe are
husband and wife and are residents of Contra Cosa County,
California.
4. Plaintiff, Judith H. Steenblik is a married woman
dealing with her sole and separate property and is a resident
of Maricopa County, Arizona.
5. All of the aforementioned parties described in para
graphs 1 through 4, either individually or as Trustees, are
hereinafter referred to collectively as plaintiffs.
6. Upon information and belief. Professional Manivest,
Inc. and Manivest Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
defendants) are corporations organized for profit under the
laws of the State of Utah, having their principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
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7. Defendants John Does 1 through 10 are individuals or
entities who, as a result of dealings with Professional
Manivest Inc., Manivest Corporation, or others, may claim see
interest cr right in the Lease or Premises which is the subject
of this action. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this
Complaint by adding the actual names of said John Does 1
through 10 as soon as the same are ascertained. Professional
Manivest Inc. and Manivest Corporation, whether individually or
as trustee, and John Does 1 through 10 are referred to herein
collectively as defendants.
8. Plaintiffs are the owners of the fee simple interest
in certain improved and unimproved real property located at the
southwest corner of 5600 South and 900 East in Salt Lake
County, Utah, the legal description of which is set forth in
the attached Exhibit "A" which is incorporated herein ty
reference. Said real property is hereinafter called tne
"Premises".
9. Plaintiffs are the current Lessors under that certain
Lease and Option Agreement dated October 15, i960, between Earl
E. Howe and Vivian J. Howe, husband and wife, and J;hr. 0. Howe
and Maxine Howe, husband and wife, as Lessors, ana ^.
Lehnherr, Herman L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, co-partners
doing business as Valley Shopping Center, as Lessees 'the
"Lease"), which originally demised certain real property which
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included but: was not limited to the Premises and which was
recorded on October 31, 1960, in Book 1754, Pages 25-32, of the
official records of Salt Lake County, Utah, A true and accur
ate ccpy of the Lease is attached as Exhibit "B" and incorpor
ated herein by reference.
At all pertinent times prior to June 1, 1988, the Premises
were subject to the Lease.
10. Upon information and belief, defendants either indivi
dually or as. trustee, claim to be the holder of Lessee's
interest uncer the Lease or claim some interest in Lessee's
interest under the Lease.
11. Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease, includ
ing but not limited to paragraph 4 of the Lease, defendants
covenanted and agreed not to assign the Lease except with the
prior consent of the Lessors.
12. Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease, includ
ing but not limited to paragraph 5 of the Lease, defendants
covenanted and agreed to maintain and keep the entire Premises
in good condition and repair during the term of the Lease.
13. Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease, includ
ing but not limited to paragraph 5 of the Lease, defendants
covenanted and agreed to keep the entire Premises free from
weeds and other obnoxious growth during the term of the Lease.
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14. Except as was otherwise set forth in paragraph 14 cf
the Lease, pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease, includ
ing but not limited to paragraph 6 cf the Lease, defendants
covenanted and agreed to keep the Premises free and clear of
all liens and encumbrances of any nature whatsoever.
15. Plaintiffs and their predecessors have fully dis
charged and satisfied all of their cbligations under the Lease,
including, but not limited to the obligations pursuant to
paragraph 14 of the Lease to allow financing for the original
construction of improvements on the Premises, and at no per
tinent time have defendants had any further rights pursuant to
paragraph 14 of the Lease.
16. Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease, includ
ing but not limited to paragraph 9 cf the Lease, in the event
that defendants failed to perform any of their covenants or
obligations under the Lease for a period of 60 days, plaintiffs
were entitled to terminate the Lease, and Defendants were
obligated to surrender the Premises to plaintiffs.
17. The parties, as indicated in the manner in which the
Lease is structured and as indicated by the Lease term/; agreed
in effect that if it were necessary to make material a-diticnal
improvements to the Premises or if unforeseen or uncontemplated
conditions required additional financing of the Premises, then
the parties would be required to modify in writing the terms of
the Lease before any such action could be taken.
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18. The intent of the Lease therefore, as indicated by its
terms was to restrict the right of the parties to encumber or
otherwise take advantage of changing economic conditions
associated with an interest in the Lease or an interest in the
Premises.
19. Defendants have willfully disregarded their obliga
tions under the Lease and have sought to obtain economic
advantage from breaching it in ways calculated to disadvantage
the plaintiffs.
20. Despite repeated requests by plaintiffs, defendants
have willfully failed to keep and perform their covenants and
obligations under the Lease.
21. Despite repeated requests, defendants have allowed
weeds and other obnoxious growth to accumulate upon portions of
the Premises.
22. Upon information and belief, defendants have failed
and refused and neglected to maintain the Premises in good
condition as required by the Lease, and the Premises, including
but not limited to the improvements thereon, are in need of
substantial maintenance and repairs.
23. Upon information and belief, in May of 1978, in
connection with financing which defendants obtained from First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and without plaintiffs' knowledge
or consent, defendants encumbered the Premises in violation of,
among other provisions, paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Lease.
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24. Upon information and belief, in June of 1982, in
connection with financing which defendants obtained from Valley
Bank and Trust Company ("Valley Bank''); without plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, defendants again encumbered the Premises
in violation of, among other provisions, paragraphs 4 and 6 of
the Lease.
25. On or about December 8, 1987, without plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, defendants executed, acknowledged and
delivered to Valley Bank a Trust Deed and Assignment cf Rents
by which defendants conveyed and warranted the Premises, and
thereby created an encumbrance upon the Premises.
26. On or about January 5, 1988, without plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, the aforementioned Trust Deed and
Assignment of Rents was recorded in the official records of
Salt Lake County Utah, as Entry No. 4571125, in Book 5994, at
Pages 1434-1439.
27. On or about December 8, 1987, without plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, defendants executed, acknowledged and
delivered to Valley Bank an Assignm.ent of Lease by which defen
dants sold, assigned and transferred the Lease to Valley Bank.
28. On or about January 5, 1983, without plaintiffs'
knowledge or consent, the aforementioned Assignm.ent of Lease
was recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, Utah,
as Entry No. 4571126, in Book 5994 at Pages 1440-1444, attached
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as an exhibit to a UCC-1 Financing Statement executed by
defendants as debtor and Valley Bank as secured party.
29. Although the Lease did not require notice of default
by the Lessees, on March 30, 1988, plaintiffs notified defen
dants in writing by certified mail that defendants were in
default of their covenants and obligations under the Lease and
that plaintiffs' intended to terminate the Lease. True and
accurate copies of said notice and return receipt showing
delivery to defendants on March 31, 1988 are attached hereto as
Exhibit 'C" and incorporated herein by reference.
30. On April 29, 1988, plaintiffs mailed to defendants, by
certified mail, written notification that defendants were in
default of their covenants and obligations under the Lease and
of the plaintiffs' intention to terminate the Lease. True and
accurate copies of said notice and of return receipt showing
delivery to defendants on May 2, 1988 are attached hereto as
Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by this reference.
After receiving said notices, defendants continued to fail
to keep and perform their covenants and obligations under the
Lease.
31. On May 31, 1988, plaintiffs, by and through their
attorneys, mailed to defendants by certified mail written
notification that plaintiffs declared the Lease terminated as
of the date on which defendants first received a copy of said
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letter. True and accurate copies of said letter and the return
receipt showing delivery to defendants on June 1, 1988, are
attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by
reference.
32. In a letter dated September 28, 1988, defendants, by
and through their attorneys, controverted plaintiffs' right to
terminate the Lease and threatened to sue plaintiffs for dam
ages by reason of plaintiffs' unwillingness to consent to the
aforementioned encumbrances by defencants in favor of Valley
Bank. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached here
to as Exhibit "F" and incorporated herein by this reference.
COUNT ONE
(Breach of Covenant Not to Assign)
33. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs
1 through 32 of this Complaint.
34. Defendants have failed to keep and perform their
covenants and obligations described in paragraph 4 of the Lease
for a period in excess of 60 days; such failure is within the
contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Lease; by reason of such
failure, plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the Lease;
plai:
terms effective no-
date, plaintiffs have been and are now entitled to immediate
possession of the Premises, including but no-
^-ntiffs duly terminated the Lease in accordance with its
)t later than June 1, 1988; and since tha
limited to all
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improvements and fixtures thereon and all rents and profits
therefrom
35. An actual dispute and justiciable controversy exists
between plaintiffs and defendants with respect to their status
and other legal relations under the Lease.
36. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages
in an amount not less than the rental and all other amounts
which became due and payable pursuant to the Lease prior to its
termination.
37. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages
for defendants' wrongful withholding of possession of the
Premises in an amount equal to the reasonable fair market
rental value of the Premises from and after the termination of
the Lease until the date on which plaintiffs recover possession
of the Premises.
38. Defendants have wrongfully retained and continue to
wrongfully retain rents and other monies generated from the
Premises and have refused to vacate the Premises. While
defendants are wrongfully in possession of the Premises,
defendants are liable for keeping and performing all covenants
and obligations contained in the Lease until such time as
plaintiffs recover possession, including but not limited to
real property taxes, repairs and maintenance, public liabilitv
insurance, casualty insurance, etc.
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39. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order evicting defen
dants from the Premises and putting plaintiffs in possession of
the Premises.
40. Pursuant to the Lease, plaintiffs are entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution
of this matter.
COUNT TWO
(Breach of Covenant to Maintain)
41. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs
1 through 40 of this Complaint.
42. Defendants have failed to keep and perform their
covenants and obligations described in paragraph 5 of the Lease
for a period in excess of 60 days; such failure is within the
contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Lease; by reason of such
failure, plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the Lease;
plaintiffs duly terminated the Lease in accordance with its
terms effective not later than June 1, 1988; and since that
date, plaintiffs have been and are new entitled to immediate
possession of the Premises, including but not limited to all
improvements and fixtures thereon and all rents and profits
therefrom.
43. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages
in an amount not less than the rental and ail other amounts
which became due and payable pursuant to the Lease prior to its
term.inat ion .
-11-
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44. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages
for defendants' wrongful withholding of possession in an amount
equal to the reasonable fair market rental value of the
Premises from and after the termination of the Lease until the
date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the Premises.
45. Defendants are liable for keeping and performing all
other covenants and obligations contained in the Lease until
the date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the
Premises, including but not limited to real property taxes,
repairs and maintenance, public liability, casualty insurance,
etc.
46. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order evicting defen
dants from the Premises and putting plaintiffs in possession of
the Premises.
47. Pursuant to the Lease, plaintiffs are entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution
of this matter.
COUNT THREE
(Breach of Covenant Not to Encumber)
48. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs
1 through 47 of this Complaint.
49. Defendants have failed to keep and perform their
covenants and obligations described in, among other paragraphs,
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paragraph 6 of the Lease for a period in excess of 60 days;
such failure is within the terms of the Lease provisions,
including but not limited to paragraph 9 of the Lease; by
reason of such failure, plaintiffs were entitled to terminate
the Lease; the plaintiffs duly terminated the Lease in accor
dance with its terms effective as of June 1, 1988; and since
that date, plaintiffs have been and are now entitled to imme
diate possession of the Premises, including but not limited to
all improvements and fixtures thereon and all rents and profits
therefrom.
50. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages
in an amount not less than the rental and all other amounts
which became due and payable pursuant to the Lease prior to its
termination.
51. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages
for defendants' wrongful withholding of possession in an amount
equal to the reasonable fair market rental value of the
Premises from and after the termination of the Lease until the
date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the Premises.
52. Defendants are liable for keeping and performing all
other covenants and obligations contained in the Lease until
the date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the
Premises, including but not limited to real property taxes.
-13-
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repairs and maintenance, public liability insurance, casualty
insurance, etc.
53. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order evicting defen
dants from the Premises and putting plaintiffs in possession of
the Premises.
54. Pursuant to the Lease, plaintiffs are entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution
of this matter.
COUNT FOUR
(Appointment of Receiver)
55. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs
1 through 54 of this Complaint.
56. As set forth herein, plaintiffs have commenced proceed
ings to regain possession of the Premises and plaintiffs are
entitled to regain possession as the lawful owners of the
Premises.
57. Upon information and belief, defendants are in
imminent danger of insolvency, as set forth in Exhibit "F".
58. A dispute also exists as to entitlement and to the use
and possession of the premises. Plaintiffs have an interest in
the Premises, believe that they have good and paramount title
thereto and are entitled to the rents from the Premises for use
and possession. Upon information and belief, such rents are in
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danger of being lost by being applied fcr the benefit of
persons not entitled to the rents.
59. Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" and incorporated herein
by this reference are the 1988 Valuation and Tax Notices issued
by the Salt Lake County Treasurer for the Premises in the total
amount of $37,526.84. These real property taxes are due and
payable before 12:00 o'clock noon on November 30, 1988.
60. Upon information and belief, by reason of defendants'
failures and neglects, subtenants occupying space within the
Premises are in default in the payment of their rents and the
performance of their obligations.
61. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs' interest in
the Premises is in danger of being materially injured.
62. In order to protect their interest in the Premises,
plaintiffs are now entitled by law to the appointment cf a
receiver to obtain the business records of defendants and their
existing property manager, and any rents and income held by
either of them, all as reasonably necessary to operate tne
Premises, to serve without bond, and to have full authority
under supervision of this Court to pay operating expenses and
make necessary repairs. Defendants, together with their agents
should be barred and enjoined by restraining order or injunc
tion from asserting any right to manage, supervise, or
otherwise direct operation of the Premises, or to occupy any
-15- GGGCie
part thereof under any claimed status, and that the receiver be
empowered to collect all rents, issues, and profits from the
Premises for the benefit of plaintiffs, to account for the
same, to expend necessary maintenance, insurance, and other
operating expenses, to remit the excess of rents, issues and
profits collected from the Premises over such necessary expen
ditures to this Court pending its further decisions, and to
advertise, to lease or rent space to existing or new tenants,
to remove any occupants not lawfully occupying and paying fair
rental value, to employ professionals, to hire and fire
employees, to enter into service contracts relating to the
Premises, to maintain any legal action necessary to protect the
Premises, and to otherwise have and exercise all lawful powers
of a receiver.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court enter its
judgment declaring as follows:
On Count One:
1. Defendants have failed, refused and neglected to
perform their covenants and obligations under the Lease;
2. The Lease has been terminated in accordance with its
terms and plaintiffs are now entitled and have been entitled to
immediate possession of the Premises since its termination;
3. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual
damages against defendants for the rent and all other amounts,
- 1 6 - \j \j ^ \j -*• •
which became due and payable under the Lease prior to its
termination;
4. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual
damages against defendants for the fair market rental value of
the Premises since the termination of the Lease and for other
damages as may be proven at trial;
5. The defendants shall vacate the Premises forthwith and
grant plaintiffs restitution of possession of the Prem.ises;
6. For the time defendants were in possession of the
Premises defendants are liable to plaintiffs for ail damages
resulting from defendants' failure to keep and perform all
covenants and objections contained in the Lease.
7. The Plaintiffs shall have and recover their reasonable
attorney's fees and expenses, and costs of court and that the
Court grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate
under the circumstances.
On Count Two
1. Defendants have failed, refused and neglected to
perform their covenants and obligations under the Lease;
2. The Lease has been terminated in accordance with its
terms and plaintiffs are now entitled and have been en:it led to
immediate possession of the Premises since its termination;
3. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual
damages against defendants for the rent and all other amounts
-17-
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which became due and payable under the Lease prior to its
termination;
4. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual
damages against defendants for the fair market rental value cf
the Premises since the termination of the Lease and for other
damages as may be proven at trial;
5. The defendants shall vacate the Premises forthwith and
grant plaintiffs restitution of possession of the Premises;
6. For the time defendants were in possession of the
Premises defendants are liable to plaintiffs for all damages
resulting from defendants' failure to keep and perform all
covenants and objections contained in the Lease.
7. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their reasonable
attorney's fees and expenses, and costs of court; and that the
Court grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate
under the circumstances.
On Count Three
1. Defendants have failed, refused and neglected to
perform their covenants and obligations under the Lease;
2. The Lease has been terminated in accordance with its
terms and plaintiffs are now entitled and have been entitled to
immediate possession of the Premises since its termination;
3. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual
damages against defendants for the rent and all other amounts
-18- GGGG13
which became due and payable under the Lease prior to its
termination;
4. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual
damages against defendants for the fair market rental value of
the Premises since the termination of the Lease and for other
damages as may be proven at trial;
5. The defendants shall vacate the Premises forthwith and
grant plaintiffs restitution of possession of the Premises;
6. For the time defendants were in possession cf the
Premises defendants are liable to plaintiffs for all damages
resulting from defendants' failure tc keep and perform all
covenants and objections contained in the Lease.
7. The plaintiffs shall have and recover their reasonable
attorney's fees and expenses, and costs of court; and that the
Court grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate
under the circumstances.
On Count Four
1. For an order requiring defendants and their agents, to
turn over to plaintiffs all rents, income and revenues from the
Premises, and all books and records related thereto;
2. For an appointment cf a receiver for tne Premises;
3. For plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses, and
costs of court;
-19- GCC02Q
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems
appropriate.
DATED this /» day of November, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Plaintiffs' Address:
c/o William K. Evans
3690 Gilroy Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
By
Michael R. Carlston
JENNINGS, STROUSS & SALMON
-20-
M. Steenolik
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
GQG021
STATE OF UTAH >
: ss .
VERIFICATION
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
William K. Evans hereby deposes and states that he has read
bel^lxED this _J_ day of November, 1988.
t- r^
- William K. Evans
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this/^day of November,
1988.
My Corn-mission Expires:
3i
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j THIS INBESTUKE MADE AND ENTERED EITO this /-^^ day of
October, 1960, fey" and between EARL E. ROYS and VIVIAH HOKE, his
wife, and JOHN O. HOWE and RAXIHS HOKE, his wife, of Salt Lake
i
County, Utah, hereinafter referred to ai Lessors and J. E, LEHK52RS,
HERMAN L. FRW1C3 and STANFORD L. HALE, copartners, doing buoiness
i
under tho flm name and style of VALLEY SnoppitJG CENTER, herein-" i
after referred to as the Lessees. |
j
That the Lessors, for and in consideration of the cove-
.'-..-•*
nants and agreements hereinafter Mntionod to be fcept, paid and
t * ' v ' • - ". - ' -
perforrued by the LeeaoeB, has demised and leased to the Lessees
that certain real eBtate Bituated in Murray, Bait Lake County,
Utah, score particularly described as follovsi
• Cotrcjencing at a point 52 rods Kest and 14 rods North .
from the Southeast corner of the North\x3St quarter of
6ection 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Hcridian, and running thonce North 66 rods, uvore or
less, to the North line of the Eouth half of said
Northwest quarter/ thence West along Bald Worth line
953 feet, itore or less, to the Northeast corner of
premises described in deed recorded as Entry No. 326063,
Official Records/ thence South 1° 02' West 337.6 feet,
moro or lees, to the Southeast corner of said preAiBea/
thence wast along the Southorly boundary of Bald
premises 226 feet, mora or less, to the Southwast
corrver thereof, thonce onward Vest 321.75 fest, oore
or less, to the Northwesterly corner of a parcel of
land dascribod in deed recorded ss Entry No. 165237,
Official Records/ thence following tho exterior
•j boundaries of a parcel of land described in Bald doed
^j| South 19 rods/ thence South 27° 4S* East 32.7 rods')
thence South 50° 05* East 11.2 rods'/ thence South 4'.5
rods, more or leBS, to the South line of Bald Northwest
quarter/ thonce East along the South line of eaid
Northwect quarter to a point on the Northerly line of
Vine Street/ thence North 46° 43' 30" Eaet 71.5 feet/
thence East 189 feet/ thence South 300 feet to'the '
center of*Vine Street/ thence South 51° 24'' East along
the center of Vine Street to a point 4.5'chains'Vest
and South 2° East from the Northeast cornor of the ,'•
Korthwost quarter o£ the Eouthvcct quarter of said -'•
GOG027
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»i«^->, iQ West to a point on thesection 17, thence North 2 *«" ^enCO BDrthSouth lino of said No^vost^aarter, ^14 rod*/ thence East 46.? roto^ oore ^ ^ capltai
•. i^f^rr*.^^ .
TO HAVE AN. TO ^ *« S»* UNTO the *»«. *™ the
15th day o« October, 1*0. « the 15th day of October. 2010.
, « Lessee covenants and agrees to pay by way of rent
for said pro^rty «- 1^-— ^ *"" 87'5°°*00* '
receipt of ^ich is h«* pledged, Second year. ,7.500.00.
payable one W^ - «., -ird year. .£,.000.00,
year thereafter *,« «- ~ of thl. ^,024.000.00 ^ y~
The rental provided herein payable after the first ,.« *-» -
p5ld in e.ai — ly U.t.»~t. on the fir.t «•* of —
B,d the first -y of each and every ,onth thereafter during the
tern of this Leaeo.
- * ii in addition to the rent hereinbefore
. 2 Lessees shall, in aaaitiu«
6criboa p^rtv. -a «* ^-nt. — - *~« th6r"n
ot.,.. «*«,.. for .ervloe. or utility —«- « the -.«« »
any te^ts of the — .!«-«- ^ «- -l- Pr~lS°-
S. « 1. asreoa between the partle. hereto that the
^.e. eon^l*. to an* P^ant to t^a«^— «- (
ieon.twti» .«- — — -*"'on th" *"l"a prrolBe!i vhlcH .,.,1 collate th.. Installation of utmtle-Pcn th. *-,
,„. ., » to scrva .11 P«t. thereof, the construction .
rtiBed premises so e» tu -.•-<...'--••- -- I
o£ ^xeu,,. »o other uprov-ot. on 6Bi= Pre,Ue, „a the «*-
leBBl„g of th. .— ** .i^ov^nf Place, upon «1- ^l...
pr^e .h.llW» th. proportv of th. -co. ...lo^- thl.
-2-
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Lease regains in full force and effort.
4. Lessees shall have the right to assign this Lease
and Option to purchase to a corporation to be forced for^tho pur
posed carrying out'the'ter*. of this Agreement. Such assignment
Ehall not releose the Lessee of any liabilities hereunder. Except
as to the assigns permitted pursuant to this paragraph, this
Lease shall bo unassignable except vith the prior consent of the _
Lessors. Provided, hoover, that the Lessees or their assignee^
as herein provided shall have the right to enter into subleases of
portions of the talsad praises.'provided," hovever, that «id
sublease, shall not attach to or become binding in any vay upon
the fee interest of the Lessors, that said lessees shall be Halted
to that class of business commonly known of as "retail trade and
service".
5. Lessees agrees to be responsible for the entire de
mised praises, and during the' ten, of the lease to maintain the
sa.-* and keep it free firoa weeds and other obnoxious growth/ that
it will not allow any of it. lessees to conduct any business or
perform any act in violation of the ordinance, orregulatlons of
Hurrary City, the laws of the State of Utah or the United States
Government.
6. Lessee agrees to keep the demised premises free and
clear of all liens and encumbrances of any nature ^ataoever, ex
cept as to thos* liens created pursuant to Paragraph 14 hereof.
7. The Lessors shall have the right at all reasonable
tir.es to inspect the tolsed pre^lses^and any and all improvements
placed thereon. ' • *~ - " •- ' . "
8. It is covenanted and agreed between the parties
hereto.that the Lessor does not by anything herein contained vaiUe
• ''•'; ""- - 3-' '•'' '•'
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,oy rights under an. pursuant to th. landlord-, lien 1- a. pro
viso by the statutes of the State of Otah.
9. should lessee, fail to pay th. rant heroin reserved
or ma*, any of th. other payments or barges to be paid by the.
hereunder or fall to *»P any covenant herein contained to bo per
formed by Leasee, or within sixty (60) day. thereafter, then in
that event, without notice from th. lessors, thi. Agreement shaU
«,„. and terminate, and tho Lessee, .hall surrender said premise.
to the Lessors.
10. If tho Lsbbw. .hall abandon or vacate Bald premlec
or. for causa, be removed therefrom, th" — -Y *° «-l* b* th0
lessor for such rent and on s|>=h ten,, a. «•!«.« »V reasonably
obtain, and If a sufficient mm Bhall not ba thus realized to sa
tisfy the mlnl^u* rent hereby reserved, the Lessees agree to pay
and satisfy all deficiencies.
' 11. If Lessees shall iw*. or attempt to make an assign
ment for the benefit of creditor..'or If .petition for voluntary
„r involuntary bankruptcy 1. filed against or on behalf of Lessees
the Lessor may termlnato this Lease and an mount equal to the
total of the minimum monthly rental for each and every month then
regaining in the term of thi. lease shall Mediately booone due
and payable, less such sum a. Lessor may bo able to realize by ro-
rentin, the premises for such.rent and on such term, as Lessor may
see fit.
12. This Agreement Bhall not be Bodifisd or changed ex
cept by the written agreement of the parties hereto, o ,
13.' This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of end
be binding upon the heirs, successors, personal representatives,
administrators, and assigns• of the parties hereto. •
" '^:i..; ;:."-•-.v."f "• ;-^4-:': '•"•"• ''• • •.""•
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14. The Lessors agroo that upon tho Lessees supplying
thea with a duplicate original lease between the Lcssoos and some
tenant qualified by the tonne of this Agroeroont to bacon* a sub
lessee and providing the Lessors with full information concerning
the terms and conditions of the proposed mortgage and the construc
tion agreement providing for tho application of the proceeds of
the ease, the Lessors will subordinate their Interest in the land
upon which the Jjsproveoant is to bo roade to a Eingle first rortgage
of such reasonable aaount as may bo necessary to finance the con
struction of the improvements called for by said Lease Agreement.
said subordination shall be exocuted by the Lessor, conveying caii
property to tho Lcesoq or Rib-lessee as the case iaay be, vho shall
cause a first mortgage to bo placed thereon and to reconvay said
property to the Lesser without any assumption by the Lessor of the
obligation to pay any sunt cue or to become due by reason of said
mortgage.
15. The Lessees are hereby given an Option to buy any
or all of the demised premises upon tho following terras and con
ditional •
The purchase price for tho first t\»lve (12)_oonth«_ fol
lowing the execution of this Agxcercnt shall be $365,000.00, said
purchase price shall be increeced upon the first anniversary of
this Agreeraent by the sun of 620.00 por acre for each acre then
covered by this Leace, and upon each and every anniversary of this
Agreement for the first five years by e ID'jo amount, and thereafter
\ •••-/•-".
it shall bo increased 8100.00 per acre, for each aero then covered
by this Lease, per year. , -
16. The Option herein grcnted shall be e^arciood by the
Lessees giving notice in writing to the Lcseors of their exercise
." . . «l
MO*'*' |»l.»o» ""D Il.O.1"
GGQQ31
ptlon to
pply to
ess than
he whole
racta
;ss than
le whole
;rra of
>tion
•auction
i rental
istract
: title
£.1754 «•• 30
of this Option, describing therein the tract of land bo acquired,
and offering to pay the purchase price a. herein provided, upon
receiving a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying said land
to the Leasee. :- ," "•', •-• '•'••'•'• •?•'.'.
The Option hereby granted shall provide to the whole of
the said tract of land and to a ten-acro portion thereof, and
after said ten-acre portion or more shall have been purchased by
the Lessee, to' any other three-acre or larger tracts. Should the
Lessee exercise option to purchase' a ten-acre tract or larger, but
less than the whole hereof, the purchase price'shall be tho pro--
rata share of tho total purchase price as herein provided for,
plus 610,000.00. Tho subsequent tracts Df land shall bo at the
prorata acreage price hereinbefore provided, provided however that
the total purchase price shall not be more than the total purchase
price as herein provided. -"- -'-. ••': .•'/
17. Any tract so purchased shall be designated by the
Lessee; it shall be contiguous with itself and any tracts thereto
fore purchased by the Lessee; it shall have" four sides, i.e., a
street side, two Bide lines at right angles to the street, and
a straight rear line; and the street frontage shall be in the Ban>a
proportion to the total street frontage that the area beara to the
total area.
18. This Option shall endure for fifteen (15) years from
date hereof.- The exercise of the right" of the Lessee to purchase
lees than the whole hereof shall effect a prorata reduction in the
rental payable hereunder, after the'payment of the'purchase price"
as herein provided. '' '"
19. The Lessor shall furnish the "Lessee, upon deinand,
a good and sufficient abstract of title'certified to as of the'-'-
data of this Agreement, or any.j^stfl^ubsequent thereto, and the
MO'r.T Iviiua »•• Iloohi* • . " '
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obligation of the Lessors shall bo United to delivering a good
and marketable title as of tho date of this Agreement. Lcasora
covenant not to encunber the title to said property.
20. The Lessor, and Lessees each agree that should thoy
default in any of the covenants or agreeinents contained herein,
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's foe, which may arise- or accrue fror, enforc-
I ij ing this Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises
covered hereby, or in pursuing any renody provided hereunder or by
tho statute, of the state of Utah whether such remedy is pursued
by filing a suit or otherwise.
21. As herein used, the singular nutter includes the
plural and the masculine gender includes the feninine and tho
neuter.
m 22. The Leesee covenants and sgreos to conusance construq^
tion of tho shopping center herein contemplated within «<?Pf~"GH /
days of the date of this Agreement, and to thereafter diligently
proceed with the developcant and construction of said shopping
canter. .
23. Tine is of tho essence of this Agree^nt, including
the provisions of Paragraph 22. Performance of the conditions of
Paragraph 22. hoover, shall be cxcucod by strikes, accidents, nets
of God, weather conditions and other causes of nonperformance b2-
yoad tho control of the Lessee. -• -•.
24. Real estate taxes for the year 19S0 shall ba pro
rated as of the date" of this Agreeioent.''' - • '
IH wrists wnER,-07#'the"parties hereto have caused this
-' • '---7- - • - •
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"'' On thisj^day ofOctober, I960, personally appeared
before w, EARL B. BOVK and VTVXAS>**. hi» vlfe. end Jons O. kwb!
and WKXNB HOWE, hi. vifo/^o, being first duly sworn. acV^ledgjc
to":^ that they executed the foregoina Lease and Option ** lasers
riv'co:rsipclon Expires!
• ^ V
STATE O? UTAH )
) •«
COUNT* O? SALT LAKE ) .
nn fhia jy^day of OctoberI 1960, personally appeared
before M J. B. LEHS3ERR, HEKKAH L. PRAKKS and STAKFORD^HALE,
Who. being first Wevorn.' a^
the foregoing Lease and Option as Lossess.
/""i^^-Ky Cor»isslon Expires.
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
John P. Ashton (0134)
Brian S. King (4610)
Attorneys for Defendants
City Centre I, Suite 900
1"5 East Fourth South
-•tv, utsh b<:::
- _ _ — c r.-:
w
it; the THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR'
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE Or '
N AND E
JOHN 0. HOWE, Trustee; ROBERT E.
HOWE =r.d BONNIE F. HOWE,
r.uscand and «;:e; WILL IAll K.
EVANS ar.c CAROLE H. EVANS,
husband and v;ife, as Trustee;
and JLEITH H. STEENBLIK,
Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants,
v ^
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INS.,
a Utah corporation;
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC.,
a Utah corporation, as Trustee;
MANIVEST CORPORATION, a Utah
rcrprracior; and JOHN DOES I
through 10,
Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
Civil No. £S:
'u d o e J . L i r. r. i s
Defendants Professional Manivest, Inc. end Ma:
Corporation (hereafter "Manivest"), by and through its
rvest
UNCL YEATFS
QELDZAHLER
C#ntr» I.SuU.BDO
Ias\ ^ounr Sojiri
S»l! L»ie C'ly
L*:i?-. bt'.'A
el'V S2*-1000
the date of this Answer, and, as a non-material breach, fails
to justify forfeiture of the lease.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
The terms of the lease between the parties do not bar
Manivest, in its ordinary course of business, from assigning
for security purposes its rights to a third party so long as
such conduct does not endanger or jeopardize plaintiffs'
interest or equity in the property which is the subject of this
action.
NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 66
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in seeking to have a
receiver appointed for the property.
WHEREFORE, Manivest prays that plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, that plaintiffs take
nothing thereby and that Manivest recover its attorneys' fees
and costs pursuant to the terms of paragraph 20 of the lease
between the parties.
COUNTERCLAIM
Counterclaim-plaintiffs, Professional Manivest, Inc.
and Manivest Corporation, (hereafter "Manivest") counterclaim
and allege against the plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants
(hereafter "Howes") as follows:
-10-
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4.
2. Venue is appropriate pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 7B-13-1 and 4.
FIRST CAUSE 0" ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
3. Manivest is the successor to the interest of
J. E. Lehnherr, Herman L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, lessees
under that certain lease dated October 14, I960.
4. Howes are the successors to the interest of the
original lessors under the same lease.
5. Under paragraph 4 cf the lease agreement, the
leasehold interest may be assigned with the prior consent cf
the lessors.
6. At times prior to the date of this Complaint, the
Howes and/cr their predecessors allowed Manivest to tlecce
and/cr assign its leasehold interest in the subject rrctertv to
third parties and thereafter make improvements en the nrc-e-ty
without objection and without claim that such action
constituted a breach cf the lease.
7. On January 22, 1988, Manivest requested that
Howes consent to the assignment by Manivest of its leasehold
interest, solely for the purposes of security, to Valley Bank &
Trust Company. Under the terms of the Acknowledgment cf
•SINCE. YEATES I1
* OELDZAHLEA I
i L*mr« 1, Suli.eOC |(
'. E.i! Fourth Soulti 'I
S*l: Lake CUy !
Uu- B4M' |
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Assignment Manivest requested the Howes sign and subsequent
correspondence forwarded to the Howes from Manivest and Valley
Bank, it is clear that the assignment was for security purposes
only and did not jeopardize or endanger the nature, extent or
priority of the Howes' interest in the property.
8. Despite this full explanation and assurance given
by Manivest: to the Howes, the Howes, without any legitimate
reason, refused to grant consent to the requested assignment
and sign the Acknowledgment of Assignment.
9. The withholding by Howes of their acknowledgment
of the assignment was unreasonable under the ci rcumstances,
constitutes a breach of the express and implied conditions of
paragraph 4 cf the lease between the parties and impaired
Manivest's working relationship with Valley Bank & Trust.
10. Manivest has been damaged by the Howes'
withholding of consent in an amount exceeding $50,000, to be
proven with greater specificity at trial in this matter, rlus
consequential damages, Manivest's attorneys * fees and costs
pursuant to the agreement between the parties, and interest.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fair Dealing and Good Faith)
11. Manivest realleges and incorporates by reference
the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 10 above.
12. In addition to the actions outlined above, In the
period beginning in approximately 1985, Howes made repeated,
-12-
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frivolous claims that Manivest was in breach of the lease
between the parties.
13. The claims have been made by the Howes as a
pretext to obtain possession of the property which is the
subject of this lease and relieve themselves of what they
perceive to be disadvantageous contractual obligations.
14. These actions on the part of the Howes
demonstrate a failure to deal fairly and in good faith with
Manivest and further constitute harassment and interference
with Manivest's regular business activity with the purpose of
impairing Manivest's ability to perform its obligations under
the lease.
15. The Howes' actions have been carried out in an
Intentional and malicious effort to divest Manivest cf its
interest in the property, and Manivest has been damaged in an
amount exceeding $50,000, to be proven with greater specificity
at trial cf this matter, plus punitive damages in an amount
exceeding $50,000, all consequential damages, Manivest's
attorneys' fees, costs and interest.
WHEREFORE, Manivest prays for judgment against Howes
as fcilows:
A. For judgment against Howes on Manivest's First
Cause of Action in an amount exceeding $50,000, to be proven
with specificity at trial in this matter, plus consequential
carnages, Manivest's attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the
- ± J-
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agreement between the parties and interest.
B. For judgment against Howes on Manivest's Second
Cause of Action in an amount exceeding $50,000, to be proven
with greater specificity at trial of this matter, plus punitive
damages in an amount exceeding $50,000, all consequential
damages, Manivest's attorneys' fees, costs and interest.
C. For such further relief as the Court deems
equitable in the premises.
DATED this ' 5 day of January, 1989.
PRINCE, YEATES &
Brian S. King
Attorneys for Kanives
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that, on the /•? ~'L day of January,
1989, I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy o
the foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM to the following:
Michael R. Carlston, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah . 84145
Counterclaimants' Address:
255 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
6463k/010789
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error, because some of the alleged defaults, such as the weeds,
were clearly technical.
b. If the decision was based on the cumulative
effect of the alleged defaults, then Manivest is entitled to a
new trial because the decision was tainted by the Court's legal
and factual errors as to several of the alleged defaults that
cumulatively formed the basis for lease forfeiture.
11. The Howes' application for attorneys' fees and
costs was untimely under Rule 54(d)(1), Utah Rules cf CiviI
Procedure. Also, the award of fees and costs was not supported
by competent evidence and was excessive.
ARGUMENT
I .
PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE LEASE DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY
OF THE MANIVEST ASSIGNMENTS
Paragraph 4 of the Lease states, in pertinent part,
that "this lease shall be unassignable except with the prior
consent of the Lessors." The purpose of this provision is to
permit a Lessor to determine the ability of the proposed
assignee of the Lessee to perform under the lease. See,
Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal.
1965). The purpose is not to prohibit using the Lease as
security for loans to the Lessee. Even the Howes admitted, in
their Trial Brief, that paragraph 4 does not prohibit the use
of the Lease as security for the Valley Bank and other loans.
(R. 435, pp. 18, 30.) See also, Chapman v. Great Western
Gypsum Co., 14 P.2d 758 (Cal. 1932).
IX.
THERE WERE NO LEASE DEFAULTS BY MANIVEST MATERIAL
ENOUGH TO WARRANT LEASE FORFEITURE.
Utah appellate courts have consistently voiced the
law's disfavor of contract forfeiture, strictly construing
forfeiture provisions against the party seeking that harsh
remedy. Moon Lake Electric Association, Inc. v. Ultrasystems
Western Constructors, Inc., 757 p.2d 125, 128 (Utah Apo.
1988). When forfeiture ". . . would allow an unconscionable
and exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable relationship to
the actual damage suffered, we have uniformly held it to be
unenforceable." Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 452 (1952).
The party alleging forfeiture must plead and prove its case by
clear and convincing evidence. New Mercur Mining Co. v. South
Mercur Mining Co., 128 P.2d 169, 272 (1942).
Eorfeiture is available only if the breach "defeats
the very object of the contract" or is "of such prime
importance that the contract would not have been m.ade :f
default in that particular had been contemplated." Po iyglycoat
Corp. v. Hoicomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) (quoting
Willistcn on Contracts, 3d. Ed., vol. 12, § 1455).
Virtually all jurisdictions also require proot cf
substantially more than a technical breach before granting a
lease forfeiture:
. . the law will not sanction a forfeiture
of possession where no substantial injury
occurs or where a mere technical breach cf
the lease is involved.
Harar Realty Corp. v. Michiin & Hill, Inc. , 449 N.Y. Sjpp. 2nd
213 (N.Y. 1982). Courts also agree that where a party
-J3-
continues to receive the benefit of the bargain, technical
breaches do not trigger forfeiture.
1n Southern Hotel Company v. Miscott, 377 N.E.2d 660
(Ohio App. 1975), the appellate court listed the equities the
trial court properly considered in finding no material breach
had occurred and forfeiture was unjustified: (1) the
probability that the landlord would continue to receive the
benefit of the bargain by obtaining lease payments from the
tenant; (2) the tenant's substantial capital improvements on
the property; (3) the tenant's tender of rent immediately upon
being given noti.ce of forfeiture; and (4) the tenant's
substantial loss if forfeiture were granted.
The First and Second Restatements of Contracts
incorporate similar principles in §§ 275 and 241,
respectively. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 241 states
In determining whether a failure to render
or to offer performance is material, the *
following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured
party will be deprived of the benefit which
he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured
party can be adequately compensated for the
part of that benefit of which he will be
deprived;
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(c) the extent to which the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform
will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform
will cure his failure, taking account of all
the circumstances including any reasonable
assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior
of the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform comports with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.
The equitable principles outlined in § 241 of the
Restatement and in cases such as Southern Hotel all weigh
heavily against forfeiture here, as illustrated by the
following facts:
1. Even assuming the assignment^ of Manivest's
leasehold interest to Valley Bank or First Security Bank were
lease defaults, these assignments merely allowed Valley or
First Security to step into Manivest's shoes and cure any
default under the Lease. Because of the undisputed financial
strength of both lenders, Manivest's assignments actually
increased rather than decreased the probability that the Howes
would receive the benefits bargained for under the i96 0 Lease.
2. Any nominal damage the Howes could possibly show
was compensable without requiring forfeiture. Nonetheless, the
Howes never asked for any award of compensatory damages but
instead requested the most far-reaching, radical remedy of
all: a judgment terminating the Lease and forfeiting
Manivest's leasehold interest. Even the Howes admitted, in
their Trial Brief, that there were ether more conservative
-41-
Vremedies that would adequately protect their interests (R. 435,
pp. 29-30).
3. Forfeiture of the Lease was immeasurably harmful
to Manivest by depriving it of a stream of income the Court
found had a present value of over $500,000. Moreover, Manivest
would lose its substantial capital improvements in the
property. Although the Court purported to "offset" these
amounts against the value of the Howes' reversionary interest
(Add. No. 3, p. 7) no findings were made as to the value of
this interest.
4. Before this action was filed, Manivest completely
cured many of the technical breaches alleged to have occurred,
by voiding most of the "assignments" or "encumbrances" of which
the Howes complain (Tr. 253-255), and by increasing its
maintenance and weed and debris control efforts . Moreover,
even the newly-alleged defaults were readily curable. E£. Tr.
322. Over the decades, Manivest has paid its rent, paid off
debt secured by the Lease and acted responsibly to address weed
control and related problems as they arose. From this history,
the Howes have adequate assurances that Manivest can and will
perform its lease obligations in the future, once this Court
determines what those obligations are.
5. The above actions also establish Manivest's good
faith in dealing with the Howes. The allegations and findings
of Manivest's bad faith emanate either from Manivest's good
faith disputes with the Howes over the proper interpretation of
-42-
the Lease (Trial Ex. 30, 32) or from trial court misperceptions
unsupported by evidence in the record (Add. No. 3, p. 4).
This Court should also consider the following
additional factors in weighing^the equities:
1. The lease does not expressly require either
notice of forfeiture or opportunity to cure. Moreover, no
notice of default or opportunity to cure was given as to the
newly alleged defaults discussed elsewhere herein. Without
notice or opportunity to cure, a higher standard than even
"material breach" should be imposed before forfeiture is
permitted. This is especially true here, where the
requirements of the Lease were in dispute. See, First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983)
(forfeiture not permitted unless contract is "clear and
unequivocal" or where notice of default is "indefinite or
uncertain" Without a requirement of notice and opportjnity to
cure, virtually any pretext for forfeiture can be usee ty an
overreaching landlord, as is the case here.
2. It is clear from the record here that the Howes
were looking for any such pretext to either force
re-negotiations under threat of forfeiture, or actually make
good on the threat and end what they perceived (a Irr.ost 20 year;
later) to be a bad bargain. They felt that they shou.rj be
getting $200,000 per year in rental rather than $24,00'
(R. 462), and even argued that their "damages" include :
additional rent they could have imposed as a condition to
consenting to lease assignments (R, 708).
-C~.-
3. As also discussed elsewhere herein, the Howes'
refusal to consent to the Valley Bank assignment breached the
implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. One
who seeks equity must come before the Court with clean hands.
In light of the foregoing factors, this Court should
determine that, as a matter of law, there was an inadequate
basis for forfeiture cf the lease.
X.
AT MINIMUM, MANIVEST IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL
BECAUSE THE FORFEITURE DECISION WAS TAINTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL AND FACTUAL ERRORS.
Manivest submits that the law and facts that inform
the foregoing arguments compel reversal of the Judgment cf
Forfeiture and reinstatement of the Lease without the need for
further proceedings, except on ancillary issues such as the
amount cf Manivest's attorneys' fees. However, even if this
Court credits some of the trial court's findings or
conclusions, the trial court's remaining legal and factual
errors sufficiently taint the outcome to require a new trial on
the ultimate issue of forfeiture.
If the trial court had correctly construed paragraphs
4, 5 or 6 of the lease, or the Manivest Liquidating Trust
document; if the court had excluded evidence of newly alleged
defaults, ordered a continuance or reopened the evidence; if
the court had not made the findings as to which there was no
supporting evidence; or if the court had weighed a11 of the
equities necessary for a determination of forfeiture, perhaps
that determination would have been different. A reversal of
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trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence related to the
maintenance issue, which Manivest disputes, at most the Howes
are entitled to a new trial. Manivest does not dispute the
need for a new trial, given the taint created by the trial
court's errors.
ARGUMENT
I.
CLEAR WRITTEN NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE
WERE REQUIRED AS TO EACH ALLEGED DEFAULT THAT
FORMED THE BASIS FOR LEASE FORFEITURE
At page 9 of their brief the Howes argue that the
lease did not require written notice of default. See also,
Verified Complaint, If 29 (Add No. 2 to Manivest's opening
brief.) Nonetheless, they also argue that they gave Manivest
adequate written notice of the alleged defaults and an
opportunity to cure. There is no merit to these arguments.
In Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976),
the seller under an installment contract for the sale of real
property (which is not dissimilar to a 50 year ground lease)
contended that the buyer's interest had been forfeited, even
though no written notice of default or opportunity to cure had
been given. Unlike the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract,
and like paragraph 9 of the lease at issue here (Add No. 1 to
Manivest's opening brief), the contract in Hansen did not
require notice of default or opportunity to cure. Instead, the
contract "provided that after the continuance of a default for
ninety days the seller had a right to exercise three options"
(i.e. foreclosure, forfeiture, or other legal remedy). I_d at
1154.
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Nonetheless, this Court held that these contractual
provisions "are not self executing. They require some
affirmative act on the part of the seller." The Court also
held that mere notice of termination, without opportunity to
cure, was not enough:— :
[T]he seller must give the defaulting buyer
a reasonable time within which to cure the
default. Without this notice the defaulting
buyer would not know what to do. He would
not have certain knowledge his tenancy was
at an end. He could assume that the seller
may have waived default, or would elect to
enforce the contract rather than forfeit it;
or he could assume he would be permitted to
perform."
(Id . Footnote omitted.)-''
Hansen applies here, even in the face of paragraph 9
of the lease, which states that in the event the lessees "fail
2/ In Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988), this
Court held that where the seller chooses the remedy of
acceleration of the contract rather than forfeiture,
notice of default and an opportunity to cure are net
necessary unless required by the contract. To that
extent only, the Court overruled Hansen. However, the
Court reaffirmed Hansen, as applied to contractual
forfeitures: "Forfeiture is a harsh remedy, and a seller
must therefore give a buyer notice of default and a
reasonable period of time in which to cure the default
before exercising a forfeiture provision." 748 P.2d
1086-1087 (citations omitted). That this requirement
applies regardless of the contractual provisions is shown
by the next sentence of the Court's opinion: "In fact,
written notice of default is expressly required by . . .
the contract." Id. at 1087.
3/ See Also, Restatement of the Law (Second) Property 2d
Landlord and Tenant, Vol 1, § 13.1, comment h. at p. 389
(1976):
The landlord may hold the tenant in default,
under the rule of this section, for the tenant's
failure to perform a promise contained in the
(Footnote continued on next page)
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to keep any covenant herein contained to be performed by
Lessees, or within sixty (60) days thereafter, then in that
event, without notice from the Lessors, this Agreement shall
cease and terminate...."
First, this provision is not self-executing, even
though forfeiture is the only remedy expressly provided. As
suggested in Hansen, the lessors could waive the default, or
they could elect to affirm rather than forfeit the contract and
sue for damages, specific performance or some other remedy, or
they could allow the lessees to cure.-'
Second, the fact that the Howes did give notices of
default and of forfeiture either evidences their belief that
paragraph 9 was not self-executing, or constitutes a waiver or
estoppel as to any claim that it was self-executing.
Third, the requirement of notice in Hansen is not
simply to inform the lessee which remedy the lessor has elected
to invoke upon the lessee's default. The notice mandated by
Hansen is a product of simple fairness, bygiving the lessee
facing forfeiture "a reasonable time within which to cure the
default". Hansen at 545 P.2d 1154. Under Hansen, opportunity
(Footnote continued from previous page)
lease only if the landlord has requested the
tenant to perform and given him a reasonable
opportunity to do so.
4/ Also, paragraph 11 of the lease, now also relied upon by
the Howes in their brief, is expressly not
self-executing. Paragraph 11 provides that in the event
of lessees' assignment for the benefit of creditors, "the
Lessor may terminate this Lease . . .** (Emphasis
added.) As in Hansen, forfeiture is optional, not
automatic.
_5_
to cure is required regardless of which remedies are otherwise
available, even the remedy of a "self-executing" forfeiture.
Attached as Addenda "A", "B" and "C" hereto (Trial Ex.
30, and 31) are copies of the three notices (dated March 30,
1988, April 29, 1988 and May 31, 1988) offered up by the Howes
to justify forfeiture of Manivest's leasehold. The only
defaults complained of in these notices are the December 1987 -
January 1988 lease pledges to Valley Bank as security for
financing, and "piles of Christmas-time trash and last year's
crop of obnoxious weeds ... and ... the surface of the
parking lot is not and for some period of time has not been in
good order or repair . . .". (Add. "A", p. 2).
Nonetheless, at trial the Howes summoned up a host of
other alleged defaults that were never the subject of any
notice of default prior to termination. These same alleged
defaults also found their way into the trial court's Findings
of Fact (Add. No. 4 to Manivest's opening brief) and were the
foundation for the trial court's imposition of the harsh
judgment of forfeiture. These "notice-less" alleged defaults
included:
1. Purported encroachments in 1983 (Trial Ex.
10, Finding No. 5);
2. A May, 1978 pledge of the lease to First
Security Bank as security for financing (Trial Ex. 11, Finding
No. 6), which was subsequently released (Tr. 253, 254);
3. A pledge of the lease to Valley Bank as
security for financing in 1982 (Trial Ex. 12-14, Finding No.
7), which also was subsequently released (Tr. 254);
-6-
4. Lease assignments between Manivest
controlled entities in 1976 and 1978 (Trial Ex. 22, Finding No.
19);
5. A purported assignment to the Manivest
Liquidating Trust on April 28, 1988 (Trial Ex. 21, 40, Finding
No. 20);
6. Alleged violations of Murray City ordinances
in 1983, and in 1989 after the lease had already been
purportedly terminated (Trial Ex. 23, 26, 28, 37, Findings No.
21, 22);
7. Alleged health and safety violations ob
served in 1989 or 1990, again long after the lease had purport
edly been terminated (Trial Ex. 39, Tr. 168, Finding No. 23);
8. Underground Storage Tanks (Finding No. 24).
The Howes' brief bristles with contentions that
Manivest enjoyed "grace periods" (p. 45) and the opportunity to
cure these defaults. This assertion is belied not only by the
Howes' failure to give notice of the alleged defaults
enumerated above, but also by the content of the notices they
did give.
Where is the "grace period" in the Howes' initial
notice of March 30, 1988? That notice simply stated: "Based
upon these defaults, it is our position that we are entitled to
terminate Manivest's rights under the Lease" (Add. "A", p. 2).
The Howes' April 29, 1988, notice demanded performance17 but
5/ However, the April 29 notice addressed only the lease
pledge to Valley Bank, not the allegations regarding
weeds, debris and potholes in the parking lot.
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did not specify what the purported "grace period" was: "On
behalf of the lessors, I hereby advise you that time is of the
essense [sic] and that we insist upon strict performance . . ."
(Add. MB", p. 2).
Other than indicating that time was of the essence,
this second purported notice gave no inkling of the period in
which cure was expected. Was it 60 days, as one might infer
from paragraph 9 of the lease, or a longer or shorter period?
Did the period begin to run from April 29, 1988, when
performance was first demanded, or from March 30, 1988 when the
Howes attempted to terminate the lease without giving any
opportunity to perform? The third notice dated May 31, 1988
(Add. "C"), purported to terminate the lease effective upon
receipt of the notice, even though it was sent only 32 days
after the April 29 notice first requesting performance.-y
Thus, even the notices of default that the Howes did
give were too "indefinite or uncertain" to sustain a
forfeiture. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659
P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983). Also, forfeiture is permitted
only where the agreement itself has "clear and unequivocal
terms. " I_d. Here, even if the Howes' tortured interpretations
of the lease were correct, it suffers from "ambiguity or lack
6/ The Howes also argue that Manivest was remiss in failing
to cure even after the date upon which its interest in
the lease was forfeited, which the trial court found to
be June 1, 1988 (Conclusion No. 8). However, based upon
this finding, Manivest no longer owed the Howes any
contractual duties after that date.
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of clarity" fatal to a claim for forfeiture, because it fai led
to provide Manivest adequate notice of what was required in
order to avoid forfeiture.±/ Id.
It is no answer for the Howes to argue that Manivest
was put on notice of the newly alleged defaults by inclusion of
some documents on a pre-trial exhibit list, or that Manivest
was required to send out interrogatories to ferret out
allegations of default not contained in any notice, or even the
Complaint. By this time Manivest's leasehold interest had
already been forfeited, at least according to the trial court.
Moreover, Hansen and Maxwell establish that it is the duty of
the party seeking forfeiture to provide adequate notice of
default, not the burden of the party against whom forfeiture is
sought to play a guessing game. In short, allegations of
default, even if proven to be true, will not support the harsh
remedy of forfeiture, if not included in a notice of default.
Reeploeq v. Jensen, 490 P.2d 445, 447 (Wash. App. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds 503 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1972), cert. den. 414 U.S.
839 (1973); Tower v. Halderman, 782 P.2d 719, 720-721 (Ariz.
App. 1989).
7/ Another example of this ambiguity is the 60-day period
referenced in paragraph 9. When does this period begin
to run? Is some notice required to start the period,
even though that same paragraph purports to eliminate any
notice requirement? Can the lessor secretly observe a
default on day one, hope the lessee doesn't discover or
cure the default, and then declare a forfeiture on day 61
as a "gotcha"? To permit such a result is to forsake
fairness and to ignore the drastic consequences of
forfeiture.
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Manivest argued the notice issues at trial in the
context of its objections, on grounds of surprise, to the
Howes' eleventh-hour default allegations. (Tr. 44-52, 96.)
Because these allegations did not appear in any pleading filed
by the Howes before trial, and because the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Manivest's motion to adjourn the
trial to permit Manivest to prepare a defense to the new
claims, Manivest had no opportunity to raise the notice defects
in any other context.
In any event, the trial court committed plain error in
premising the forfeiture on the belated default allegations.
Accordingly, the Judgment of Forfeiture and Order of Possession
must be reversed, and the lease must be reinstated and
possession returned to Manivest.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE
WAS MANIFESTLY UNJUST.
Forfeiture here was manifestly unjust not only because
of the absence of notice and opportunity to cure, but also
because it was based upon assignments that did not violate the
lease, and upon technical, non-material defaults.
A. Manivest Did Not Violate any Prohibitions Against
Assignment of the Lease or Covenants Against
Encumbrance of the "Demised Premises".
The Howes concede that Manivest's assignments as
security for financing did not violate the prohibition against
lease assignments in paragraph 4 of the lease. Instead, they
continue to argue that these assignments breached the covenant
in paragraph 6 against encumbering the "demised premises".
-10-
However, if the Howes (or their predecessors-in-interest)
intended to prevent the lessors from using the value of the
leasehold to secure financing, it was incumbent on the Howes to
clearly articulate this prohibition in the lease. General
restraints on lease assignments or encumbrances, which do not
unambiguously apply to pledges of the leasehold for security,
do not suffice, particularly when the consequence of a
transgression is forfeiture.
At page 43 of their brief, the Howes rely on R.
Powell's treatise on real property for an expansive definition
of the word "encumbrance". However, the Howes overlook
Professor Powell's comments which bear most directly on the
facts here:
Modern courts almost universally adopt the
view that restrictions on the tenant s right
to transfer are to be strictly construed.
Thus it has been held that lease provisions
prohibiting 'assignments' were not violated
by . . mortgaging the lease term; by sa.e
of the controlling stock in the tenant
corporation or change in the personnel of
the tenant partnership . . .
R. Powell, The Law of Real Property Volume 2, 1[ 248[1] at pp.
17-43, 17-44 (1991 ed.) (footnotes omitted). See also,
Restatement of the Law fs^cond) Property 2d Landlord & Tenant,
vol. 2, § 15.2, comment e., at p. 102 (1976) and illustrations
thereto. Powell similarly states:
A lease, which creates a present possessory
interest in the tenant, is an entirely
separate interest from the landlord's future
reversionary interest in the property.
Thus, the tenant in the absence of a
covenant in the lease or a statutory
restriction, has the right to mortgage his
interest in the property separately.
r. Powell, supra, If 258[1], P- 17A-57 (footnote omitted).
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The covenant against encumbrances of the "demised
premises" in paragraph 6 fails to differentiate between the
lessor's interest in those premises and the lessee's interest,
and thus cannot be construed as prohibiting mortgages of only
the lessee's interest under the rule of strict construction
suggested by Powell.
At page 36 of their brief, the Howes argue that
paragraph 6 was designed to protect their presumed right to
collect rentals from Manivest subtenants in the event
Manivest's interest was terminated. However, the Howes had no
such right because they had no privity of contract with the
subtenants. R. Powell, supra, at If 248[1], p. 17-39. See
also, the portion of paragraph 4 of the lease prohibiting any
subleases from binding the Howes. Instead, termination of the
Manivest lease would terminate the subleases and any
assignments thereof. Accordingly, Manivest's pledges of its
leasehold interest or subleases could not jeopardize any
"right" of the Howes, whether at law or reserved by the lease.
Nor did the assignments among the Manivest controlled
entities violate paragraph 4 of the lease. The Howes' attempts
to distinguish Prince v. Elm Inv. Co., Inc. 649 P.2d 820 (Utah
1982) because it involved a tenant's right of first refusal are
to no avail. The relevant issue both in Elm and here was
whether a stranger has been inserted into the transaction. The
fact that the Elm plaintiff sought to enforce a right of first
refusal rather than compel a forfeiture does not diminish Elm's
precedential value. Under the principles of Elm (at pp.
822-823), limited partnerships that have the same general
-1 2-
partner, or wholly owned corporate subsidiaries, are not
rs" to the transaction, contrary to the Howes' argument
"strange
at p
suggest that, if anything, the principles of Elm aPPlY wlth
even greater force to the issue of who is a stranger to the
lease for purposes of construing a prohibition on lease
assignments.
Also, the testimony of Larry Leeper or Swen Mortenson
about their understanding of the relationship between Manivest
and the Manivest Liquidating Trust, or about their relationship
ith the two entities, could not change the clear language of
the trust document. That language provides that the lease at
issue here was excluded from the assets transferred to the
trust, and was retained by Manivest. (Manivest Liquidating
Trust and Workout Plan, Note 1 to the Balance Sheet of
Diversified Realty, Ltd., Trial Ex. 22, 40). Accordingly,
there was no assignment in violation of either paragraph 4 or
paragraph 11 of the lease.
B. The Forfeiture of the Lease Constituted
A Windfall to the Howes.
In addition to the "assignments" discussed above,
Manivest also disputes the Howes' other allegations of default.
,t p. 32 of their brief.^ The quotes from Powell above
w
The Howes acknowledged as much here, by suing not
National Realty, Ltd., the limited partnership that was
the named successor tenant on the lease, but its general
partner Manivest, which was also the general partner of
the assignee limited partnerships (Tr. 262), and the
parent of the wholly-owned subsidiary assignee, Westco
Realty, Inc. (Trial Ex. 40, p. 2).
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Paragraph 6 played an important role. It not only protected
the Howes' reversionary estate, but also meant that a financially
responsible tenant would remain in possession. The Lease thus
left no room for a bank to "worm" its way into the deal to claim
the rental income from the subleases. The Lease prohibited
Manivest from mortgaging its leasehold and thereby impeding the
Howes' contractual right to collect rents in the event that
Manivest vacated the Property or was removed therefrom. (Ex. 1,
% 10.)»
Read separately, read in the context of applicable real
estate principles, and read together, paragraphs 6, 14 and 19 can
have only one meaning: It was a breach of the Lease for Manivest
to encumber any real estate interest whatsoever, without the
Howes' knowledge and consent. All of these paragraphs were
essential . They were a comprehensive attempt to deal with all of
the various financing issues which could arise during the term of
the Lease.
The practical consequence of this structure was that the
parties would be required to negotiate if either wanted to use
In Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960), the
landlord successfully terminated the lease and retook poseesBion. Afterwards,
when the landlord could not recover unpaid rent from the tenant, the landlord
sued the corporation to whom the tenant had assigned ite right to receive
rents from subtenants. The court held that the landlord could not enforce the
lease and collect rents from the assignee who had taken the assignment of
eubrents as security for a debt. If anything, the Baehr case further
illustrates why the HoweB had good reason to prohibit such assignments in the
Lease. In Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum, Co., 14 P.2d 750 (Cal. 1932), the
court only considered whether a mortgage on a lease violated a prohibition
against assignments. The lease did not include any other restrictions against
encumbrances.
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its respective interest for financing purposes other than for the
original improvements.36 Rather than dealing with this financing
problem in a straightforward way, Manivest borrowed for its own
benefit and without informing the Howes.
Other courts have upheld this concept. In Airport Plaza,
Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Cal. App. 1987), the
successor to the original master tenant on a 75-year ground lease
claimed the right to mortgage its leasehold interest, without the
owner's consent. The owner had subordinated to the construction
of the original improvements. Of the two pertinent paragraphs in
the Airport Pla^a lease, one addressed the "hypothecations" for
constructing the original improvements. The other merely stated:
Except as otherwise provided in this lease, lessee
shall not transfer or assign this lease in whole or in
part, or its interest hereunder . . . without receiving
the prior written consent of lessor.
Id• at 2C1. The tenant argued that because the Lease did not
expressly forbid leasehold financing after completion of the
improvements, hypothecation cf the tenant's leasehold interest
must be freely permitted. Id.
TheBe paragraphs recognized the inherent uncertainties of a long-
lease which did not otherwise address poter.t lal changes in econo~ic
rstances. For example, there were no percentage rents and r,c cost of
g s:;-Etrier,*.E, Ex. 1. Consequently, at the time cf trial the total
t that would have been payable as rent was not $24,000 per year as
ed by Manivest, but approximately $12,000 per year. (R. 701). This was
asis for the Howe's allegations in Paragraph 17 and 18 of the Corplamt.
•) See Airport Plaza, Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 19E (Cal. App.
This case is not like Bonanza, Inc. v. McLean, 747 P.2d 792 (Kan.
where the tenant sought financing only to construct additional improve-
The lessor clearly had agreed to subordinate for this purpose. The
had nc trouble finding that the tenant 's financing was "for the purpose
rrvir.c dj*. the original intention cf the parties." I_d. at 796. In
zb there was nc reference to any other prohibition in the lease against
r assignments or encumbrances.
term
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN O. HOWE, Trustee, et al. TRIAL BRIEF AND SUMMARY
Plaintiffs,
vs .
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC., Civil No. 880907595
a Utah corporation, et al.
Defendants.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Plaintiffs submit the following Trial Brief and Summary in
Support of their position."
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This action arises out of a lease (the "Lease") pursuant to
which the Howes as Lessors required a portion of their farmland
to be developed as a regional shopping center. Upon learning
'Most of Manivest's 29 page Trial Brief is simply a restate
ment of its earlier motion for summary judgment. In response,
Manivest incorporates by reference its Response in Opposition to
the Motion for Summary Judgment which convincingly distinguishes
most of the authorities upon which Manivest relies. Certain
cases, however, appear in a different context and require a
specific response.
As set forth above, an assignment for security is, by
definition, not a true "assignment." It is a collateral
assignment and is not meant to be governed by a general
prohibitions against assignments. Therefore, paragraph 4 alone
was not sufficient to protect the Howes. Without paragraph 6,
Manivest may have been able to grant an assignment for security.
Paragraph 6 was essential.
Under Utah law, all rights or estates in land, including a
leasehold estate, may be mortgaged. See Utah Code ann. § 57-1-1
et seq.; see also Bvbee v. Stuart, 189 P.2d 118 (Utah 1948). An
assignment of a lease for security purposes is a mortgage of a
lease. See e.g., Slane v. Polar Oil Co., 41 P.2d 490 (Wyo.
1935); Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 83 Ariz. 181, 318 P.2d 359
(1957). A real property interest is mortgaged if the
circumstances demonstrate that the parties intended not to
transfer the entire estate but only to create an encumbrance upon
it. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Corp., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah
App. 198 8) .
The evidence is undisputed that the following liens and
encumbrances were placed on property interests associated with
the Lease.
1. Resolution of Encroachment in favor of a third
party. The Quitclaim Deed of defendants signed by Larry
-18-
program which will keep all of the property in a clean and neat
condition. In addition, the Court should void the unauthorized
assignments and order that all interests under the Lease be
reassigned to the entity approved by the Howes in 1971.
Furthermore, the Court should order the lessee to seek and obtain
lessor's prior approval before assigning the Lease to anyone, and
order that the Lease cannot be assigned for the benefit of
creditors. The court should also order Manivest to immediately
obtain from Valley Bank a reconveyance of the tenant leases and
to make no further such encumbrances.~
VI. MANIVEST HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR ITS
COUNTERCLAIM AND THE COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
The First Cause of Action in the Counterclaim is that under
paragraph 4 of the Lease, the Howes had a duty to consent to the
Assignment to Valley Bank in 1988. There is no way paragraph 4
can be pummeled into an interpretation supporting this claim.
The evidence is clear that the defendants did not obtain prior
consent as required for any assignment. It is also clear that
paragraph 4 applies to contemplated assignments of the Lessee's
entire estate, not to assignments for security purposes. Even if
the Court were to conclude that the Howes had a duty to consent
to assignments for security purposes, they are not required to
sign documents which could jeopardize their own fee interest or
JThe Howes reserve the issue of expenses and attorneys'
fees .
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expect a return of those premises at some date and expect it
to be maintained in a fashion so that it can be used for the
purposes set forth in the lease, namely a shopping center
and retail trade and services.
Paragraph 6 is the next provision that is of
import. It provides that the lessee agrees to keep the
demised premises free and clear of all liens and encum
brances of any nature whatsoever except as to those liens
created pursuant to paragraph 14.
Paragraph 14 provides that at the outset the
lessees here, the predecessors in interest to Manivest,
would have the right to borrow money against the property in
order to construct the improvements that were initially
contemplated.
As a consequence of that, the Howes did subordi
nate their interests to various loans that were made, as I
recall, totalling in the neighborhood of a million dollars,
which money was used to build the buildings that are out
there today, and paragraph 6 provides that with the excep
tion of those liens and encumbrances that the lessee may be
assigned or may not encumber — excuse me — the property.
It is a provision separate and apart from the prohibition
against assignments.
Now, this lease is one that in some respects is
somewhat unusual. Your Honor will see that it contains a
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number of fairly harsh provisions against both parties to
the contract. It is harsh against the Howes because it sets
a flat rate rent with no clause for adjusting those rents
over the years, even though the lease was for 50 years, and
obviously back in 1960 when the lease was signed inflation
was a shown fact of life and yet there was no acceleration
or adjustment clause pertaining to the lease payments.
On the other side, the lease is harsh on the
lessee because it provides that they cannot encumber or
assign their interests or, for that matter, any interest in
that property which essentially establishes a stalemate
between the two sides.
Reading through some of the hornbooks on property
law, it's not uncommon for leases to provide essentially
stalemated positions where the parties do not want to
attempt to anticipate what the future will bring and so they
build into the lease essentially a stalemate that requires
both sides to sit down from time to time and renegotiate
their positions, and that is what is contemplated by the
lease provisions here, that once the improvements that were
subordinated at the outset became obsolete or required
repair, required substantial infusions of capital, it was —
it is obviously contemplated by the lease that the parties
would sit down and renegotiate their positions, that Howes
then being in a position to adjust the rents to meet the
1 market at the time of their renegotiation. That obviously
2 didn't happen.
3 What the lessee has done here is they have
4 secretly, we have now found out, secretly breached these
5 provisions allowing -- or prohibiting liens and encum-
6 brances, allowing them to benefit from funding, but denying
7 the Howes the opportunity to sit down and renegotiate the
8 harshness of the provisions against them, and so the end
9 result is over the last 30 years and as of today the Howes
10 are receiving approximately one-twentieth of the rents that
11 are justified by the market values of their land out there.
12 The land is worth in the neighborhood of two and a
13 half million dollars. They are getting less than a thousand
14 dollars a month for that under the current situation,
15 whereas under any standard in the industry they should be
16 getting in the neighborhood of $250,000 a year, so what the
17 unilateral and secret breaches of the lessee have done here
18 is to deprive the Howes of the financial benefits that were
19 built into the lease that would have required renegotiation
2 0 from time to time.
21 Now, the evidence regarding breaches, your Honor,
22 is hopefully going to be fairly direct and to the point. We
23 will start out by showing in 1971 that the lessee did in
24 fact come to the Howes and did in fact request that they
25 subordinate their interests and allow them, the lessees, to
